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I. INTRODUCTION

The First Lady is asked by her husband to head a task force to
assist him in developing health care policy. The fear of outside influence sparks the task force to meet in secrecy. The Federal Advisory
Committee Act, however, forbids closed meetings of this type unless
all members of the committee are officers or employees of the federal
government. May the meetings be kept secret despite the First
Lady's presence?
Immediately after leaving the White House, the First Lady is
hired to lobby for Columbia/HCA, a major health care corporation.
Illegal?
The chairman of a large corporation meets with the First Lady.
In the course of their discussions, he hands her a briefcase stacked
with cash, winks, and asks for her commitment to reducing corporate
taxes. Does federal law prohibit this?
The First Lady decides not to give up her successful career as
head of a large oil company. May she continue to involve herself with
White House policies?
The President, angry over public criticism by his wife, decides
to "fire" her from her position as First Lady. May he name someone
else for the job?,
The answers to these questions depend on a clear definition of
the role of the First Lady in government. Such a definition is, however, lacking in federal law. The First Lady's authority and accountability have yet to be seriously analyzed. Undoubtedly, the president's wife exerts, at the very least, a behind-the-scenes influence
over her husband outside the practical operation of law. History is
replete with examples of powerful wives who have wielded an influ1.
This actually happened in Peru. Recently, President Alberto Fjimori "went on national television to announce that he was relieving his wife of her duties as First Lady. In an
angry address, Mr. Fujimori said that his wife was 'unstable' and that her behavior was motivated by unscrupulous' advisers, whom he did not name." Calvin Sims, With Face-Offat a Fete,
Peru's Election Race Begins, N.Y. Times A3 (Aug. 29, 1994). Two weeks earlier, his wife, Ms.
Susana Higuchi, angered by the President's surveillance of her, had moved out of the
presidential palace for ten days. Id. She announced on August 24, however, that she would not
leave the presidential palace. In a Dispute, Peru's Leader Bars His Wife From Official Duties,
N.Y. Times A8 (Aug. 25, 1994).
More recently, South Africa President Nelson Mandela expelled his estranged wife, Winnie,
from his government for insubordination. Bill Keller, Nelson Mandela Moves to Expel Winnie
from Cabinet, N.Y. Times Al, Al (March 28, 1995). Mrs. Mandela has repeatedly "railed
against Mr. Mandela's government," and has promised to "fight from within." Id. at Al, A5. Mr.
Mandela had been reluctant to oppose his wife, South Africa's Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture,
Science and Technology, it was reported, because of loyalty, guilt, and warnings by his closest
advisers that she was "too popular to antagonize." Id. at AS.
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ence that only one spouse can have over another.2 Although the First
Lady's role has been the subject of dinner-table conversation for over
200 years, the actions of the Clinton Administration and the role of
Hillary Clinton have brought this debate to the fore.
The difficult task of defining the role of the First Lady in legal,
rather than historical or political terms, requires an immersion into
the murky waters of congressional intent and statutory interpretation. This Note posits that although a First Lady inherits a deeprooted tradition of influence in politics, she cannot be considered a
federal officer or employee for purposes of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act ('FACA") or anti-nepotism laws, but may be a "public
official" for purposes of conflict-of-interest laws. Part II of this Note
discusses Hillary Clinton's deep involvement in her husband's
Administration and her appointment to head the President's Task
Force on Health Care Reform. This appointment has sparked a
judicial attempt to define, for the first time in our nation's history, the
role of the First Lady in government. Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Hillary Rodham Clinton,3 in which

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
First Lady is a de facto officer or employee of the federal government,
lays the groundwork for this discussion. Hillary Clinton's open and
active role in the Clinton Administration has raised novel questions
about the role of presidential spouses. 4 Part III addresses the
2.
Perhaps this all began when Eve gave some bad advice to her husband. Or perhaps it
began when Sarah demanded that her husband Abraham oust a member of their personal staff
and God instructed Abraham: "Whatever Sarah tells you, heed her voice ..... Genesis 21:12.
A particularly insightful editorial has described the controversy over Hillary Clinton's role
in the current administration as a fear of the "wicked consort." East Wing, West Wing, N.J. L. J.
16 (May 3, 1993). Noting that powerful women who rule outright, such as Margaret Thatcher,
also face prejudices, the authors suggest: "What distinguishes the hostility to the wicked consort
[from the hostility to a woman who rules in her own right] is envy of her intimate relationship
with the ruler; she is feared and envied for having a hidden, irrational influence that no political
rival can monitor or match, and that no merely political criticism can end." Id.
President Clinton's decision to appoint his wife to head his Task Force on Health Care
reform can be viewed in two ways. Either he appointed a qualified, trusted confidant to oversee
an area of critical importance to him, or his wife used her undue influence over her husband to
"emotionally blackmail" herself into a position of power. Either view compels an examination of
the First Lady's legal role in government. People may criticize Warren Christopher's handling
of foreign policy, for example, but they do not question his authority to conduct it, as he has
been appointed under law and is invested with the legal power to conduct it. The same
certainty does not exist with the First Lady.
3.
997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
4.
For the purposes of this Note, the term "First Lady" denotes the spouse of the
President. At trial, both the plaintiffs and defendants in American Physicians used the term
"First Lady" rather than the term "spouse of the President," which Congress utilized in 3 U.S.C.
Section 105(e) (1988). Associationof American Physiciansand Surgeons, Inc. v. HillaryRodham
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historical importance of the First Lady, crucial to understanding the
vastness of her influence, and then analyzes the statutes and cases
focusing on whether the First Lady is, or is not, a government officer
or employee. Part IV discusses the ramifications of the First Lady's
legal role, specifically concentrating on federal conflict-of-interest
laws. The Conclusion emphasizes the need for Congressional action
to resolve the issues raised in this Note.
II. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
AND THE HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE

People can gradually be brought to understand that an individual, even if she
is a President's wife, may have independent views and must be allowed the expression of an opinion. But actual participation in the work of the government
we are not yet able to accept.
-Eleanor Roosevelt 5

A. Mrs. Clinton's Role in the Administration
When Governor Bill Clinton began his presidential campaign,
a national debate ensued over what roles his wife Hillary might serve
in his Administration. 6 The Clinton campaign and the Clintons
themselves oscillated in their portrayals of Mrs. Clinton. While they
portrayed Mrs. Clinton as a potential full partner with her husband in
governing the country, they also attempted to assure voters that Mrs.
Clinton would maintain a "traditional role" as First Lady.7 Mrs.
Clinton, 813 F. Supp. 82, 84 n.1 (D. D.C. 1993). There was some debate in the early days of the
Republic over the proper title for Martha Washington. Vice President John Adams referred to
her as "presidentress;" the Gazette of the United States suggested "Marquise;" but eventually
"Lady Washington" was settled upon. Carl Sferrazza Anthony, FirstLadies: The Saga of the
President's Wives and Their Power, 1789-1961 46 (William Morrow and Co., 1990). "Lady"
appears to have found favor as the First Lady's formal title. Id. at 46-48.
5.
Rochelle Chadakoff, ed., EleanorRoosevelt's My Day: Her Acclaimed Columns, 19361945 241 (Pharos Books, 1989).
6.
See All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, July 13, 1992) (interviewing Mrs.
Clinton concerning her potential role in a Clinton administration); Hillary Clinton says she will
be Activist First Lady, Atlanta Journal and Constitution A6 (Sept. 4, 1992) (quoting Mrs.
Clinton as planning to take a "more comprehensive approach" to the role of First Lady than
Barbara Bush). See generally Jennifer Stevenson and Barbara Hijek, Running Mate, St.
Petersburg Times IF (March 8,1992) (describing Mrs. Clinton's strengths and the possibility of
an active role as First Lady).
7.
Sally Quinn, Look Out, It's Superwoman!, Newsweek 24 (Feb. 15, 1993) (discussing a
New York Times page 1 photo opportunity of Mrs. Clinton selecting dinnerware for a state
function planned because "Hillary Clinton needed, or felt she needed, or her staff felt she
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Clinton, a successful Little Rock attorney, stated, however, that she
would take an active role in the administration, especially in the
matter of national health care policy-an area of special interest to
8
her and a key element of her husband's election campaign.
After Bill Clinton's election, Mrs. Clinton took a visible role in
numerous policy areas. It was leaked that she spent more time interviewing Judge Kimba Wood, an Attorney General nominee, than the
President did.9 More controversially, however, President Clinton
quickly appointed his wife to head the President's Task Force on
National Health Care Reform ("Health Care Task Force"), a body
formed to prepare health care reform legislation to be submitted to
Congress within the first 100 days of the Clinton Administration. 10
Health care reform, a cornerstone of the Clinton bid to win the presidency, was now squarely in the hands of Mrs. Clinton. Her appointment raised more than a few eyebrows. 1 The role of the First Lady
became no longer just a matter of casual discussion, but a matter

needed, to make a statement about the fact that although she is in charge of health care, she is
not eschewing her duties as First Lady"). The author suggests that a picture of either Barbara
Bush or Nancy Reagan inspecting China would not have made page one of the New York Times.
Id.
More recently, after the defeat of the Clinton health care package, the media focused on a
changing image of Mrs. Clinton. See, for example, Marianne Means, Hillary: No Longer
Working Women's Idol, Phoenix Gazette B5 (March 13, 1995). The author states:
I miss Hillary Clinton. The original one, I mean. The one who was my favorite
role model. The first lady currently on display is a pale shadow of the energetic political
pioneer who arrived here two years ago.
Gone is the most inspiring, politically powerful woman to occupy the White House
since Eleanor Roosevelt. In her place is a more traditional president's spouse,
promoting noncontroversial worthy causes; stressing such womanly interests as
decorating, fashions and children's well-being....
[Wihen her health care reforms died and the Democrats lost control of Congress,
the first lady lost her public cachet and her private courage. And working women
everywhere lost, too....
Oh, please. Bring back the old Hillary.
Id.
8.
See note 6.
9.
Howard Fineman and Mark Miller, Hillary's Role, Newsweek 18, 18 (Feb. 15, 1993)
(noting that "Mrs. Clinton, eager to see a woman chosen as attorney general, was impressed").
10. 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 96 (Feb. 1, 1993) (announcing the formation of the Health
Care Task Force).
11. The appointment to the Health Care Task Force sparked journalists to remark,
"Hillary Clinton is virtually a co-president with her own style and influence." Matthew Cooper,
et al., Co-PresidentClinton?, U.S. News and World Report 30, 30 (Feb. 8, 1993). The authors
quote an unnamed White House official as quipping "Of course she's in the loop.... She is the
loop" Id. at 32. Following the election, Republicans circulated a bumper sticker that read:
"Impeach Clinton-And Her Husband, Too!"
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news media, which
hotly-and daily-debated in the nation's
12
recognized the serious import of the issue.
Mrs. Clinton was said to resent the critique of her role, noting
that no one raised questions over the advice President Bush took from
his male advisors-citing President Bush's close personal relationship
with Secretary of State James Baker.' 3 Unlike a cabinet-level official,
who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and limited in her ability to conduct private business while in
office, the First Lady has no defined role, nor is it certain whether she
is subject to the same legal limitations of a cabinet official. This issue
was partially addressed in the American Physicianscase.
B. Mrs. Clinton'sRole on the Health Care Task Force
and the American Physicians Suit
When the Health Care Task Force began meeting, the gatherings were held in private to avoid pressure from outside lobbying
groups. The secrecy of the Task Force drew fire from conservative
as a method of determining
critics who recommended "Kremlinology"
14
force.
task
the
with
who was "in"
12. Weeks after the election, one journalist wrote: "Forget all the talk about Hillary
becoming White House chief of staff." Janice Castro, Grapevine, Time 15 (Nov. 23, 1992). She
stated that according to an anti-nepotism law, it would be illegal for the President to appoint his
wife to a position over which he exercises jurisdiction, and instead predicted that the First Lady
would get an unpaid position as a leader of a task force. Id. As another columnist wrote:
[Wlhile we are all arguing about whether Hillary Clinton should take a job inside or
outside the administration and which meetings, if any, she should sit in on, she already
has one job waiting for her. It is the job.., of First Lady.... [Tihere is argument over
the merit, the worthiness of the functions she will be expected to perform in the White
House: chooser of visitors, provider of hospitality, emissary to and contact with worthy
enterprises, setter of tone, selector of projects and so forth....
Meg Greenfield, First Ladyhood, Newsweek 66 (Jan. 18, 1993). After Mrs. Clinton's appointment as head of the Health Care Task Force, Democratic polltaker Geoffrey Garin warned: "If
it's just some politician heading a task force, you get rid of him and repudiate his report....
But if you don't like your wife's work, it's kind of hard to distance yourself from it." Fineman
and Miller, Newsweek at 22 (cited in note 9). Fineman and Miller noted that Mrs. Clinton has
more senior-grade aides assigned to her than the Vice President. Id. at 18. Writer Garry Wills
commented, however, that "[slince the president's spouse has no constitutional office, title, or
salary, some people resent a spouse's influence on policy or politics." Garry Wills, A Doll's
House?,N.Y. Times Review of Books 6, 6 (Oct. 22, 1992).
13. Mrs. Clinton stated: "[I]f you look at George Bush, he's advised by a coterie of men...
No one gives George Bush a hard time when he gets advice from James Baker." Mickey Kaus,
Thinking of Hillary, New Republic 6 (Feb. 15, 1993) (ellipses in original). Malcolm S. Forbes,
Jr., in a commentary entitled "Give Her A Real Job," suggested that Mrs. Clinton be given a
statutory post, which "would allow Mrs. Clinton's abilities and policies to be judged in public
like other government officials." Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., Fact and Comment, Forbes 25 (Feb. 15,
1993).
14. Kremlinology, Wall St. J. A14 (March 24, 1993). When the White House issued a list
of Task Force members, the Journal sarcastically remarked, "Toto ran up to the large curtain
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The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, a
healthcare lobbying group, subsequently sued Mrs. Clinton, claiming
that the Health Care Task Force must hold public meetings as required by the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act. 15 FACA subjects
advisory committees 16 to various "sunshine" provisions that require
public meetings and records. 17 Congress enacted FACA in response to
fears over the use of advisory committees as devices to further private
interests.8 Therefore, the statute exempts from its public disclosure
requirements advisory committees that are composed wholly of fulltime officers or employees of the federal government. 19 The American
Physicians group argued that Mrs. Clinton was not a federal
employee or officer under FACA and that the task force meetings
would, thus, need to be open to the public.
Federal District Judge Royce Lamberth held that Mrs. Clinton
was not a federal employee or official-a holding that would require

that separated the Task Force from the people and pulled it down." The Wizards of Oz, Wall St.
J. A12 (March 29, 1993).
15. American Physicians,813 F. Supp. at 84.
16. 5 U.S.C. app. §8 1-15 (1988). As defined in FACA, an advisory committee is:
[Any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other
similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof (hereafter in this
paragraph referred to as "committee"), which is (A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies,
in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more
agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that such term excludes (i) the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (ii) the Commission on
Government Procurement, and (iii) any committee which is composed wholly of full-time
officers or employees of the FederalGovernment.
5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (1988) (emphasis added).
17. FACA requires that each advisory committee meeting be open to the public. 5 U.S.C.
app. § 10(a)(1) (1988). Advisory committees must file and publish timely notice of meetings in
the Federal Register, and all interested persons may attend. Id. at § 10(a)(2)-(3) (1988).
Furthermore, the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendices, working papers, drafts,
studies, agenda, or other documents are to be made available for public inspection. Id. at §
10(b). Because the Health Care Task Force meetings had already concluded by the time the
Court of Appeals heard the case, the court battle was over disclosure of the working papers and
the viability of the legislative products of the task force meetings. For a discussion of FACA's
history and its relationship to the First Lady, see generally Anessa Abrams, The First Lady:
Federal Employee or Citizen Representative under FACA?, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 855 (1994)
(noting that the result in American Physicians will limit public participation in public policy
initiatives).
18. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, P.L. 92-463, Legislative History, at 3492, 3496,
3500, and generally. "One of the great dangers in the unregulated use of advisory committees is
that special interest groups may use their membership on such bodies to promote their private
concerns." Id. at 3496.
19. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C)(iii) (1988).
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the task force to hold its meetings in public.20 Therefore, until the
21
task force actually formulated its recommendations to the President,
it was required to open its meetings.22 The district court enjoined the
task force from any further meetings until it complied with FACA.23
The task force fied for a charter, announced its meetings in the
Federal Register, and offered one public meeting. Otherwise, its
24
gatherings remained closed.

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded Judge
Lamberth's ruling.25 With Judge Silberman writing for the majority,

the court found Mrs. Clinton to be, at least for purposes of FACA, a
full-time officer or employee of the government. 26 Rather than addressing the constitutionality of FACA, the court redefined the statutory meaning of "officer" so as to construe FACA as not applying to
the Health Care Task Force.27 Judge Lamberth had written that task
20.
21.

American Physicians,813 F. Supp. at 90.
Id. at 93. Judge Lamberth held that FACA "impermissibly imposes upon the

President's enumerated power . . . to recommend to Congress such measures as he deems
necessary and expedient, but only as to those meetings of the Task Force at which the Task
Force formulates its recommendations or presents these recommendations to the President."
Id.
22. Judge Lamberth ordered that (a) a charter be filed for the Task Force, (b) that it announce all meetings, (c) that all meetings for the purpose of "information gathering" and
"information reporting," as opposed to meetings for the purpose of recommendation formulation,
be held open to the public. Id. at 91-93.
23. Id. at 95. Under FACA, an advisory committee must have a charter, containing,
among other things, a description of the duties for which the committee is responsible, the
cbmmittee's official designation, the committee's objectives and the scope of its activity, the
period of time necessary for the committee to carry out its purposes. 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(c)(2)(A)(J) (1988).
24. After Judge Lamberth's order, the Administration posted notices of its closed meetings
in the Federal Register as required by FACA. These notices, signed by Deputy Counsel to the
President Vincent W. Foster, explicitly cited the district court opinion in American Physicians
for authority to hold closed meetings. See, for example, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,330 (1993); 58 Fed. Reg.
28,655 (1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 29,854 (1993). The one open meeting took place on March 29, 1993,
and solicited testimony from "consumer groups, insurers, health care providers, small and large
business interests, labor, and other interested parties." 58 Fed. Reg. 16,264 (1993).
25. American Physicians,997 F.2d at 916.
26. Id. at 911. As discussed below, the notion that Mrs. Clinton could be a federal official
or employee under FACA, but not under other federal statutes, is disingenuous. See Part IV.
27.- American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 910-11. The court stated that "[p~rudent use of the
maxim of statutory construction allows us to avoid the difficult constitutional issue posed by this
case. The question whether the President's spouse is a full-time officer or employee of the
government is close enough for us to construe FACA not to apply to the Task Force merely
because Mrs. Clinton is a member." Id.
This case bears a similarity to Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440
(1989). In Public Citizen, the Supreme Court was faced with the dilemma of applying FACA to
the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Judiciary. If FACA applied,
consultations between the Justice Department and the ABA committee would be open to the
public. The ABA had refused to hand over to various public interest groups a list of potential
judicial nominees it was considering. Id. at 447. The Washington Legal Foundation argued
that because the Justice Department "utilized" the ABA committee, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(c), FACA
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force compliance with FACA was the inevitable result of the First
Lady's private status. 28 The circuit court took the exact opposite view.
By finding the First Lady to be a federal officer, the court avoided
applying FACA. The Task Force could continue its closed meetings,
and there would be no unconstitutional restriction on the President's
29
ability to seek and accept advice.

required that the committee fie a charter, give notice of meetings, open its meetings to the
public, and make its minutes, records, and reports available to the general public. Public
Citizen, 491 U.S. at 447. The Court held that the Justice Department did not "utilize" the ABA
committee, and thus, FACA did not apply. Id. at 452,465-67.
In making its determination that the committee was not utilized, the Court dispensed with
the plain meaning of the word "utilize" to avoid the heavy constitutional implications of a finding that FACA would apply to the ABA committee. The district court (as in American
Physicians) had reached the conclusion that FACA applied, but if applied, would violate both the
President's Article II power to nominate judges and the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at
466. The Court responded that the word "utilize" is a "wooly verb, its contours left undefined by
the statute itself." Id. at 452. But see American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 923 (Buckley, J., concurring) (criticizing the Public Citizen Court's reasoning).
The Public Citizen Court declared that "[w]e cannot press statutory construction 'to the
point of disingenuous evasion.'" Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 467 (quoting United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)). Finding that a new definition of"utilize" would probably effectuate the
intent of Congress rather than elude it, the Court decided that statutory interpretation, if "fairly
possible," should be used to avoid the "dangerous constitutional thicket" it might have otherwise
had to enter. Id. at 465-67.
The American Physicians majority believed it followed this advice. See American
Physicians, 997 F.2d at 906 (discussing the Public Citizen rationale). Judge Buckley believed
the court did not. Id. at 921-23 (Buckley, J., concurring). American Physicians, now coupled
with its predecessor Public Citizen, should not come to stand for the proposition that courts may
wring out badly reasoned statutory interpretations to save statutes. As Judge Buckley pointed
out, his colleagues in the majority implicitly, and erroneously, interpreted Public Citizen as
requiringstrained interpretations of statutes in cases involving serious constitutional questions.
Id. at 923 (Buckley, J., concurring).
Compare Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (discussing the Court's rules for avoiding constitutional questions, that "if a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter") with
NLRB v. CatholicBishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 518 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating.
"it is irresponsible to avoid [a constitutional question] by a cavalier exercise in statutory
interpretation which succeeds only in defying congressional intent").
28. American Physicians, 813 F. Supp. at 90. Judge Lamberth ominously noted: "The
court today is faced with two difficult tasks: declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional; and
declaring that the actions of a new President violate the law.... It is not a power to be taken
lightly, but it is a power that must be taken." Id. at 95.
29. Representative William F. Clinger, Jr., the ranking Republican on the House
Government Operations Committee, took note of the appeals court holding, and entered the
following New York Times editorial into the Congressional Record:
A federal court in Washington has given legal meaning to the Clinton campaign
slogan,. "Buy one, get one free." The court found that Hillary Rodham Clinton, unpaid
but hard-working is "the functional equivalent of an "assistant to the President" and not,
under certain laws, a private citizen....
Mrs. Clinton was the only person not on the public payroll of the large, Cabinetlevel task force on health reform that she headed. But the U.S. Court of Appeals,
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The circuit court remanded the case with instructions that the
district court examine FACA's application to the task force in light of
its finding that Mrs. Clinton was a federal official under FACA.3 In a
concurring opinion, Judge Buckley rejected the majority's view of the
First Lady's role, and instead supported the district court's previous
conclusion that the First Lady is neither a federal official nor employee, thus subjecting the Task Force to FACA's disclosure
provisions. Judge Buckley went further, however, arguing that FACA
31
is unconstitutional as applied to presidential policymaking.
It is not only FACA and the Health Care Task Force's viability
that hinge on the role of the First Lady. Her status implicates the
efficacy of several conflict-of-interest laws as well. The ability of a
career-oriented First Lady to maintain her outside work while serving
in the White House is at issue. Implicated as well are federal laws
that seek to limit the "revolving door," the ability of outgoing federal
employees and officers to leave government service only to use their
influence to lobby their former co-workers and employees. 32 It is not
too far-fetched to expect that a First Lady, after spending years in the
most powerful residence in the world, might desire to capitalize on
her position by accepting employment as a lobbyist following her
tenure as First Lady. 33 Other issues exist. For example, do federal
relying heavily on Congress's appropriations for the First Lady's staff, found her a public
servant for purposes of the law.
The White House was lucky in its appeal to draw a panel of judges appointed by
Ronald Reagan. Judges Laurence Silberman, Stephen Williams and James Buckley are
like many Reagan appointees: they believe in exalted Presidential power. They saw the
law [FACA] as a potential incursion on executive privilege, depriving the President of
the confidential advice he needs to do his job.
By contorting the law to find Mrs. Clinton a public employee, and therefore rule
that her task force was not covered by the law, Judges Silberman and Williams said
they were avoiding a decision on whether to strike the law down as unconstitutional.
Judge Buckley, unable to view Mrs. Clinton as a public employee, concurred in the
result but said he would have struck down the law....
139 Cong. Rec. E1685 (daily ed. June 30, 1993) (quoting A Very Private Public Servant, N.Y.
Times A14 (June 29, 1993)).
30. The statement that the First Lady is an officer under FACA is most unusual because,
as discussed below, the court's reasoning would make the First Lady an officer in all cases. See
notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
31. American Physicians,997 F.2d at 924-25. In Judge Buckley's words: "Because I can
find no credible argument to the contrary, and because I cannot bring myself to strain the
meaning of 'officer' or 'employee' to produce one, I would hold that the Task Force was not
exempt from the public disclosure requirements of FACA.... ." Id. at 924.
32. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
33. Former First Lady Barbara Bush is reported to command between $40,000 and
$60,000 for a speech. See Ruth Marcus, Bush to Get $100,000 for Amway Convention Speech,
Wash. Post A5 (Sept. 4, 1993) (citing speaking fees for several former federal officials). Though
not illegal, this income demonstrates the ability of a First Lady to capitalize on her former
position.
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bribery laws apply to the First Lady? If the First Lady accepted
bribes, her actions might bring down a government. But they may not
be illegal under federal law. The anti-bribery laws, as well as other
conflict-of-interest laws, apply to those considered "public officials," a
4
standard different from the officer-employee standard used in FACA.3
Is the First Lady, then, a public official? These questions are significant and require answers.
Hillary Rodham Clinton offers an excellent model for studying
the legal limits on the First Lady, for she has moved the debate over
the First Lady's role from the White House to the courthouse. But
Mrs. Clinton is not the first presidential spouse to cause us to think
about the role of the First Lady, nor will she be the last-unless
Congress acts to clarify just what her role is.
III. THE ROLE OF THE FIRST LADY
A. The FirstLady in History and Tradition
In American Physicians, the government contended that the
tradition of public service by First Ladies lent support to the conclusion that the First Lady is a de facto officer or employee of the federal
government. 3 5 The lives of First Ladies are well documented, and
many of these women did, indeed, occupy important places in the
White House. 36 If we are to grasp the nature of the legal problems
created by a First Lady with an undefined role, it is important to
understand the extent of responsibility First Ladies have frequently
assumed.

34. See Part N.C.
35. American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 904. The government argued that First Ladies act
as "advisers and personal representatives of their husbands," indicative of their official role in
government. Id.
36. Historian Betty Boyd Caroli notes the general fascination Americans have always had
for the First Lady:
The absence of any clearly defined role for presidential wives, the possibility that they
exercised some private influence on their husbands, and their place as symbols of how
women ought to behave made them the object of the same kind of media attention that
surrounded actresses, sports figures, and society women.
Daniel C. Diler and Stephen L. Robertson, The Presidents, FirstLadies, and Vice Presidents,
White HouseBiographies1789-1989 9 (Cong. Quarterly, 1989).
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The primary responsibility of the First Lady has always been
3 7 Of
to act as hostess or organizer of White House social events.
course, not all First Ladies have cherished this role. Some, like
Letitia Tyler, Margaret Taylor, and Abigail Filmore avoided social
appearances, while others, like Eleanor Roosevelt and Helen Taft,
were political actors and viewed their social duties merely as formalities.38 Nevertheless, our nation's history is replete with examples of
First Ladies whose activities far exceeded conducting state dinners.
The first First Lady, Martha Washington, sought to win respect for the new nation in the courts of Europe by bringing dignity to
the office of the Presidency. 9 She did not involve herself with political matters, and, instead, confined herself to dinners, receptions, and
parties. 40 Mrs. Washington did not seek wide authority for her post,
and, noting the inherent limitations placed upon her activities, she
4
referred to herself as a state prisoner. 1
37. Id. at 7. "Custom demands that the president's wife organize and preside at social
events. The first lady is supposed to arrange any teas, receptions, banquets, coffees, and state
dinners that the president may have. And although she has both a personal and the White
House domestic staff to assist her, the basic responsibility is still hers, even on those occasions
when she does not have to act as hostess." Id. at 8.
Margaret Williams, Mrs. Clinton's chief of staff, apparently played a role in the White
House investigation of Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster's death. Representative Dan Burton of
Indiana, on the floor of the House, gave an admittedly partisan account of what took place the
night of Mr. Foster's suicide:
The three officials who went into his [Mr. Foster's] office in violation of the [sic] what the
chief of staff, Mr. [Thomas] McLarty, said was going to be done, were Bernie Nussbaum,
the President's counsel; Hillary Clinton's chief of staff, I don't know what she is doing in
there, Margaret Williams; and special assistant to the President, Patsy Thomasson.
It was later revealed at last August's congressional hearings before the Committee
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs that Bernie Nussbaum gave one of the files
concerning Whitewater to Margaret Williams, Hillary Clinton's chief of staff. After
checking with Hillary Clinton, Ms. Williams locked the file away upstairs in Hillary
Clinton's personal residence, and several days later it was given to the President's
personal lawyer. When the President's First Lady was asked about this, she said it was
locked away in a file and we didn't look at it.
The Economics of Spending Cuts-and Whitewater, 141 Cong. Rec. H207, H208 (daily ed. Jan.
11, 1995).
The allegations concerning this incident were serious enough that 43 United States
Senators issued a letter to Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell in March 1994, informing
him that they would delay President Clinton's nomination of a new Chairman of the FDIC until
the Senate Banking Committee could conclude various investigations in this matter.
Specifically mentioned as a Senate concern was the role Mrs. Williams played in the incident.
140 Cong. Rec. S13975 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1994).
38. Diller and Robertson, Presidents,FirstLadies,and Vice Presidentsat 7, 101-02, 105-06
(discussing attitudes ofvarious First Ladies toward their roles).
39. See Paul F. Boiler, Jr., PresidentialWives 6 (Oxford U., 1988) (discussing Martha
Washingtons early duties).
40. Id. Boller reports that Alexander Hamilton criticized Mrs. Washington for attempting
an awkward imitation of royalty. Id.
41. "I live a very dull life here, and know nothing that passes in town. I never go to any
public place-indeed, I am more like a State prisoner than anything else. There are certain
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Abigail Adams, her successor, was determined to expand the
role of the First Lady.42 Indeed, she was quite conscious of her role in
advising her husband and expressing her opinion on important
political questions. However, when she learned she had been quoted
by a merchant who publicly articulated a position of hers, she ex43
pressed surprise that anyone would have taken note of her thoughts.
John Adams' opponents referred to Mrs. Adams as "her majesty," and
one senator stated that President Adams would not make a
nomination without her approval."
Dolley Madison took an immediate interest in politics, serving
as official hostess for Thomas Jefferson. 45 When James Madison captured his party's nomination for president, his opponent, Charles
46
Pinckney, remarked he was beaten by both Mr. and Mrs. Madison.
In her role as hostess, Mrs. Madison dealt with delicate matters of
where to seat ambassadors and whom to welcome officially. She was

bounds set for me which I must not depart from, and as I cannot do as I like, I am obstinate and
stay home a great deal." Id. It is unclear what the "bounds" for her role were.
42. See generally id. at 13-30 (outlining the life of Abigail Adams). Even before assuming
the role of First Lady, Mrs. Adams was determined to be politically active. When her husband
was elected a member of the Continental Congress, Mrs. Adams began calling herself "Mrs.
Delegate." Id. at 16. In 1784, when John Adams was Minister to England, she tried to pressure
him to ask the Dutch for a badly needed loan for the United States. He refused. Mrs. Adams
then urged Thomas Jefferson, then Minister to France, to pressure her husband to seek the
loan. Jefferson did, Adams got the loan, and then gave the credit to his wife. "It is all your
intrigue which has forced me to this loan.... I suppose you will boast of it as a great public
service." Id. at 28.
43. Anthony, FirstLadies at 63 (cited in note 4). 'The man must have lost his senses. I
cannot say that I did not utter the expression... but little did I think of having my name
quoted.... It will ...serve as a lesson to me to be upon my guard." Id.

44. Id. Though Mrs. Adams wholeheartedly supported her husband, she differed with him
on the question of whether the United States should war with France-she favored military
action. Boller, PresidentialWives at 19 (cited in note 39). Boiler notes that when President
Adams appointed William Vans Murray to lead a peace delegation to France, he incurred the
fury of the Federalists who pushed for war. "Oh how they lament Mrs. Adams' absence!"
President Adams remarked. "She is a good Counsellor! If she had been here Murray would
never have been named, nor his mission instituted." Id. Mrs. Adams was cognizant of this and
stated that the Federalists "wisht the old Woman had been there; they did not believe it
[Murray's appointment] would have taken place." Id.
45. See id. at 36 (noting that Mrs. Madison served part-time for eight years as hostess).
By serving as official hostess to Thomas Jefferson, Dolley Madison arguably assumed the role of
First Lady. However, she was not, in fact, married to him. There is no requirement that the
President be married while in office or that he take a family member to assist him with state
functions.
46. Anthony, FirstLadies at 80-81 (cited in note 4). Pinckney quipped that while he was
beaten by them as a team, "I might have had a better chance had I faced Mr. Madison alone."
Id.
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outgoing and visited card games and racetracks. 47 Her best known
act, however, was in eluding British Admiral Cockburn, who planned
to take Mrs. Madison hostage and parade her through the streets of
London. 48 When the British sacked Washington in 1814 and burned
down the White House, Mrs. Madison narrowly escaped, bringing
with her the famous Gilbert Stuart painting of George Washington
49
crossing the Delaware.
Perhaps the most famous example of the power wielded by a
First Lady is that of Edith Wilson, who served as the only conduit
between President Woodrow Wilson, crippled by a stroke, and the rest
of the country. 0 Mrs. Wilson herself suggested that President Wilson
resign and allow the Vice President to act, but on advice from one of
President Wilson's doctors, she agreed to act as a "steward."'
Another account suggests that she demanded her husband remain
President so that the incapacitated President would rely on her to
carry out his duties.52 Claiming to be nothing more than the
President's emissary, Mrs. Wilson met with cabinet members, though
some suspected that she was something more than a mere conveyer of
information. In fact, Mrs. Wilson did not hide the fact that she did

53
not tell the President everything other government officials told her.

Mrs. Wilson's apparent control over the government was so great that
famed League of Nations opponent, Republican Senator Albert Fall,
pounded his fist at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee declaring, "We have petticoat Government! Mrs. Wilson is
54
President!"
First Ladies have had varying degrees of success in influencing
their husbands. President Jimmy Carter included his wife Rosalynn

47. Id. at 83. Dolley (Dorothea Payne Todd Madison) was such a popular hostess even
before she became First Lady that Thomas Jefferson, whose own wife, Martha, died many years
before his election, recruited Mrs. Madison to serve as official hostess beginning in 1801, a full
eight years before her own husband became President. Carole Chandler Waldrup, Presidents'
Wives, The Lives ofAmerican Women of Strength 30 (McFarland & Co., 1989).
48. Anthony, FirstLadies at 90 (cited in note 4).
49. Id. at 91.
50. See generally id. at 371-84 (giving a detailed account of Mrs. Wilson's use of executive
authority).
51. Id. at 372 (citing Mrs. Wilson's own account of the situation, as contained in her
pencil-draft memoirs).
52. Waldrup writes that Mrs. Wilson '"iercely resisted any effort to have Vice President
Thomas Marshall assume the office of President. Instead she elected to make decisions and
help Woodrow sign documents based on what she thought he would have done." Waldrup,
Presidents'Wives at 248 (cited in note 47).
53. Anthony, FirstLadies at 375-76 (cited in note 4).
54. Id. at 375.
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in cabinet meetings, 5 and she frequently pressured him to act contrary to his own opinions. But as she remarked in her autobiography,
she seldom swayed him.56 Mrs. Carter believed in an expansive role
for the First Lady, noting that although traditionally First Ladies
were expected to manage the public and social aspects of the White
57
House, neither she nor the public expected a narrow role any longer.
Thus, Mrs. Clinton is not the first First Lady to take an active
political role-or to face criticism for doing so. Nor is she the first
First Lady to be accused of financial impropriety.s8 Julia Grant, wife
of Ulysses S. Grant, had prominent associations with the "robber
barons" of the day, most significantly Jay Gould and Jim Fisk.59
When the scandal was uncovered that Fisk and Gould had tried to
corner the gold market with the help of important Government officials, the two directly implicated Mrs. Grant and accused her of making enormous profit from the activities. Her role in the crisis was
never fully determined.60

55. Arguably, this practice creates a FACA problem. See American Physicians, 997 F.2d
at 905 (stating that if the President's spouse routinely participated in cabirfet meetings, but
were not considered a de facto officer, "he or she would convert an all-government group,
established or used by the President, into a FACA advisory committee").
56. Rosalynn Carter, FirstLady from Plains 164 (Houghton Mifflin, 1984). Mrs. Carter
recounts her differences with the President on the death penalty, abortion, and the Panama
Canal Treaty. "I was never able to budge him on these issues--but neither did he budge me."
Id. at 164.
57. Id. at 292-93. She writes:
The political victories for women were important ones, and being a woman who
mattered pleased me very much during my time as First Lady. But I never forgot that I
was there because my husband held his high office, not because I had been elected. I
had helped him get there, and I liked to think he couldn't have done it without me....
First Ladies throughout our history have been expected to be adoring wives and perfect
mothers, to manage the public and social aspects of the White House to the satisfaction
of all critics, and to participate in 'appropriate public service.' The role of the First Lady
is a difficult-and sometimes nearly impossible-one to fill, and each one of us has dealt
with this challenge in her own way.
The role has changed dramatically along with the expanded opportunities of other
women in America. . . . Until quite recently, First Ladies were expected to limit
themselves to the duties of official hostess and private helpmate, and most of them
never varied from this narrowly restricted role.
Id. at 292.
58. In the wake of the Whitewater scandal, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed an
independent counsel to investigate "whether any individuals or entitites have committed a
violation of any federal criminal or civil law relating in any way to President William Jefferson
Clinton's or Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton's relationships with: (1) Madison Guaranty Savings &
Loan Association; (2) Whitewater Development Corporation; or (3) Capital Management
Services." 28 C.F.R. § 603.1 (1994).
59. Anthony, FirstLadies at 211 (cited in note 4).
60. Id.
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Seen in this context, the debate over whether or not the First
Lady should have political power is largely irrelevant. She does. But
the mere fact of exerting political power does not transform her, or
any other private citizen, into a government officer or employee. That
is a question of the First Lady's legal role.
B. The FirstLady in the Law
As explained in Part II, the constitutionality of federal statutes, such as FACA, the efficacy of conflict-of-interest laws and, in the
case of controversial outside employment or bribery, the political
legitimacy of a White House, may all be dependent on the answer to a
single question: Is the First Lady an officer or employee of the government?
1. The Government Organizations and Employees Act:
Defining an Officer
The Government Organization and Employees Act defines an
employee as "an officer and an individual" who (1) is appointed in the
civil service, (2) performs a federal function under authority of law or
an Executive act, and (3) is supervised by the President, Congress, or
another federal officer.61 All three tests must be met to qualify as an
2
employee for the purposes of federal law.6

The words "employee" and "officer" often work in tandem.
Whether one is a government "employee" or government "officer"

61. Government Organization and Employees Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2105 (1988). The Act states:
(a) For the purpose of this title, "employee", except as otherwise provided by this section
or when specifically modified, means an officer and an individual who is(1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official
capacity(A) the President;
(B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress;
(C) a member of a uniformed service;
(D) an individual who is an employee under this section;
(E) the head of a Government controlled corporation; or
(F) an adjutant general designated by the Secretary concerned under section
709(c) of title 32,
(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an

Executive act; and
(3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph (1) of this
subsection while engaged in the performance of the duties of his position.

62.

Baker v. United States, 614 F.2d 263, 266 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
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depends on how Congress created the position.63 The inquiry into the
status of the First Lady necessarily begins with this question: Has
Congress provided for her position, and if so, how? This critical inquiry, however, poses great difficulty.
Indeed, in American
Physicians,the D.C. Circuit noted that statutes proffered by the government to authorize a position for the First Lady were so ambiguous
that the Government was forced to take the position that the First
Lady was assuredly an officer or employee of the federal government-but it could not decide which one.6 Nevertheless, while the
Constitution speaks only of the appointment of officers and inferior
officers, 65 rather than employees, courts consider these terms synonymous.6
The American Physicians court examined the First Lady's
employee or officer status in light of Title 5 of the United States Code,
Section 2105, and concluded that Mrs. Clinton had not been appointed
to the civil service and was, thus, not an employee within the meaning

63. Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920). It is "the manner in which
Congress has specifically provided for the creation of the several positions, their duties and
appointment thereto" that controls whether a person is considered an officer or employee of the
federal government. Id.
64. American Physicians,997 F.2d at 905. "[T]he government is uncomfortable at having
to choose whether Mrs. Clinton should be thought of as an officer or employee. The government's discomfort is quite understandable." Id. The court, noting that the First Lady is not
actually appointed or elected, found it difficult to classify her position. Id.
65. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (providing the President with the authority to appoint
"Officers of the United States" and "inferior Officers").
66. Baker, 614 F.2d at 267. 5 U.S.C. § 2104 defines "officer" separately from the Section
2105 definition of"employee," which seems to include within it the definition of an officer, but is
somewhat broader. Section 2104 states:
§ 2104. Officer
(a) For the purpose of this title, "officer", except as otherwise provided by this
section or when specificaly modified, means ajustice or a judge of the United States and
an individual who is(1) required by law to he appointed in the civil service by one of the
following acting in an official capacity(A) the President;
(B) a court of the United States;
(C) the head ofan Executive agency; or
(D) the Secretary of a military department;
(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law
or an Executive act; and
(3) subject to the supervision of an authority named by paragraph (1) of this
section, or the Judicial Conference of the United States, while engaged in the
performance of the duties of his office.
5 U.S.C. § 2104 (1988). Judge Buckley believed that the First Lady could not be viewed as an
employee at all because employees are paid and the First Lady is not. American Physicians, 997
F.2d at 919 (Buckley, J., concurring).
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The majority noted the possibility, as the

Government had argued, that Congress did not intend for FACA to be
bound by the Section 2104 and 2105 definitions.68 If FACA relied on a
definition of officer or employee different from sections 2104 and 2105,
the court could have limited the scope of its ruling to the proposition
that the First Lady is an officer or employee for FACA purposes only.
But the American Physicianscourt did not find this argument compelling.69 As stated in the district court's opinion, FACA itself provides
no express definition of "employee."70 The reason for this "glaring
omission" is that Congress had already provided comprehensive
definitions of "employee" and "officer" in Title 5 of the U.S. Code 71
In Section 2105, for example, Congress codified the definition
of "employee" to avoid the necessity of defining the term in every
statute codified in Title 5.72 Most, if not all, legislation concerning the
conduct, payment, and responsibilities of government employees
relies on Section 2105 to define the term's statutory scope.73 If not
confined to the definition in Section 2105, the term "employee" would
be subject to varying judicial constructions for every different statute
codified in Title 5. It is implausible that the very provision through
which Congress explicitly intended to increase convenience and
simplicity would be now interpreted merely as loose guidelines
begging litigation. 74 Similarly, Section 2104 states that its definition
of "officer" may be superseded if specifically modified, 75 suggesting
that the definition given in Section 2104 controls unless Congress
expressly provides otherwise. Hence, if Congress did intend for
sections 2104 and 2105 to control, then the analysis of whether the
First Lady is a federal officer or employee should go no further than
67. Id. at 903. The court stated that it would, for purposes of FACA, consider Mrs. Clinton
an employee anyway so as to avoid the "serious constitutional problems" that could result
should FACA's sunshine provisions apply to the task force. Id. at 903-06.
68. Id. at 904. The court indicated that Congress had deleted sections of FACA that
provided definitions of officer and employee paralleling sections 2104 and 2105 of Title 5.
Instead of the Title 5 definitions, the court stated that Title 1 of the U.S. Code provides another
definition of federal officer-as including "any person authorized by law to perform the duties of
the office." Id. (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
69. Id.
70. American Physicians,813 F. Supp. at 86.
71. Id.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 2105 (1994) (History; Ancillary Laws and Directives).
73. See, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 3101 (1988) (providing general authority for the federal
government to hire employees); 5 U.S.C. § 3332 (1988) (requiring an officer to submit an
affidavit that he has not paid consideration for his appointment); 5 U.S.C. § 3582 (1988)
(delineating the rights of transferring employees); 5 U.S.C. § 6303 (1988 & Supp. 1993)
(determining how much leave an employee is entitled to).
74. See note 72 and accompanying text.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1988).
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the point at which it can be determined whether she fits within the
confines of these congressionally mandated definitions.
It is difficult to see how the First Lady, as First Lady, has been
76
appointed to the civil service, or somehow competes for her position.
This seems to lead to the inevitable conclusion, as both Judge
Lamberth and Judge Buckley concluded in their opinions, that the
First Lady is not a federal officer or employee, but simply a private
77
citizen, married to the President.
2. Title 3 of the United States Code, Sections 105, 106:
Creating the Office, Deconstructing It
In American Physicians,the government argued that the First
Lady, indeed, has a statutory position in the civil service: She is an
"assistant to the President. 78 Under the White House Personnel
Authorization Act of 1978, Congress authorized the President to hire
and set the salaries of White House Office employees. 79 In addition to
creating the one hundred personal advisers to assist the President,
Congress authorized these assistants to provide services to the
76. Because the presidential spouse is not specifically mentioned as either an officer or an
employee in any statute, the only way she could become one is to be "appointed to the civil
service" by either the President or the Congress. American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 903. 5
U.S.C. Section 2101 defines the "civil service" as "all appointive positions in the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches" with the exception of the uniformed services. 5 U.S.C. § 2101
(1988). 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a) provides:
The "competitive service" (those positions for which people compete) consists of(1) all civil service positions in the executive branch, except(A) positions which are specifically excepted from the competitive service by
or under statute;
(B) positions to which appointments are made by nomination for confirmation
by the Senate, unless the Senate otherwise directs; and
(C) positions in the Senior Executive Service.
5 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (1988).
It is clear that the First Lady does not compete for her position as one would compete for a
regular government job. There are no applications for the position. Furthermore, the First
Lady is neither nominated nor confirmed by the Senate. First Ladies have not followed, nor
have they been asked to follow, any of the procedures required of federal officers. American
Physicians,997 F.2d at 920 (Buckley, J., concurring) (noting that Mrs. Clinton "has neither been
appointed to nor confirmed in the position of 'First Lady,' she has taken no oath of office, and
she neither holds a statutory office nor performs statutory duties").
77. See American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 920 (Buckley, J., concurring) (concluding that
efforts to characterize the First Lady as an employee "lack an argument in support of the
proposition" and that there is "no such argument" that the First Lady is an officer); American
Physicians, 813 F. Supp. at 90 (finding that the First Lady is not an officer or employee of the
federal government).
78. American Physicians,997 F.2d at 904.
79. 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (1988).
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President's spouse "in connection with assistance provided by such
spouse to the President in the discharge of the President's duties and
responsibilities."0 The government argued that Congress, through
this authorization provision, understood that the First Lady assists
the President in discharging his duties and thus serves as an "officer"
of the federal government. The American Physicians court was persuaded by this argument and read Section 105(e) as creating a de
facto official position for the Presidential spouse. 81
This reading of the statute is inaccurate. Although Congress
may have assumed that the First Lady is a de facto "assistant," this
assumption does not necessarily imply that she holds an office.
Furthermore, the plain language of Section 105(e) suggests simply
that when the First Lady is helping the President discharge his
duties, the President's assistants may assist the First Lady. That is,
the statute does not authorize a position entitled "First Lady;" rather,
it provides merely that as part of their duties, White House employees
created by the statute may assist the First Lady when she is helping
the President in his official duties. So, for example, if the First Lady
82
were planning a state dinner, the White House staff could help her.

80. Id. at § 105(e) (emphasis added).
81. American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 904-05. "It is reasonable, therefore, to construe
section 105(e) as treating the presidential spouse as a de facto officer or employee." Id.
82. This statute may merely have codified a practice common prior to the adoption of
Section 105(e) in 1978. Eleanor Roosevelt borrowed from her husband's staff to answer the
hundreds of thousands of letters that poured into the White House, and Letitia Baldridge,
President Kennedy's social secretary, claimed to have forty people working under the First
Lady-including helpers borrowed from the President. Diller and Robertson, Presidents,First
Ladies, and Vice Presidentsat 13 (cited in note 36). Even though the First Lady was given a
staff of her own, her staff often was too small to handle the work. Id.
Rosalynn Carter recounted that the "most painful disagreements" she had with the
President were over her staff. Carter, First Lady from Plains at 168 (cited in note 56). She
writes:
Jimmy's efforts to conserve and save the taxpayers' money affected just about every part
of our lives in the White House. The most painful disagreements we had were about
staff ... At the White House, I thought, I would have all the staff I needed. I was
wrong. Jimmy planned to cut, not add to, the number of people working in the White
House, and all my pleas fell on deaf ears. "Everybody always wants more staff, and
that's why the federal government gets so overloaded," he would say to me time and
again. "Anybody you talk to in government will say, 'I need at least one more worker."'
"But I'm not anybody you talk to in government. I'm your wife!" I insisted, not always
quietly.
According to the White House personnel records, I had little reason for complaint.
They showed that every First Lady in recent history had drawn from staffs of similar
size....
What I soon realized was that the staffs change with each administration,
depending on the needs of the First Lady. In the past, if a First Lady was very active
she always needed more staff and drew from other sources: Some administrations used
volunteers and part-time workers; some borrowed from other agencies.... I tried...
borrowing a staff person from Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) who helped with
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The legislative history behind Section 105(e) summarizes the
provision as merely "[a]uthoriz[ing] assistance and services to the
spouses of the President and Vice-President," without mentioning
anything associated with the services those spouses might provide. s3
As Judge Buckley observed, this provision is carefully worded so that
it does not name a position or prescribe duties for the First Lady.M
This authorization provision simply acknowledges the reality that
First Ladies often help their husbands.85 Thus, to read Section 105(e)
as creating or recognizing a position of the First Lady as an "assistant
to the President" clearly strays from an accurate reading of both the
8
language and the intent of the authorization statute. 6
Section 105(e), then, provides two competing frameworks: the
government's position in American Physicians, that Section 105(e)
establishes the First Lady as a federal official; and, alternatively, the
position that Section 105(e) creates no federal authority for the First
Lady, leaving her a private citizen. The ramifications of either option
are substantial; yet remarkably, these consequences rarely have been
discussed. If Congress has, in effect, created an official post for the
my volunteer program for three months, but Jimmy discouraged that too, and with a
good argument. If HEW could spare someone, then they had too much staff. He never
did give in to my pleas, and though my staff was not paid overtime, the lights burned in
my offices until late every evening.
Id. at 168-69.
83. White House Personnel Authorization, S. Rep. No. 95-868, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4
(1978) (reporting legislative history of Public Law Number 95-579, now codified as section
105(e)). This interpretation, that Section 105(e) exists only to allow the First Lady to make use
of presidential assistants herself, makes even more sense in light of the fear of "detailing," a
White House practice of removing executive employees from the posts to which they were hired
and placing them in the White House Office. This practice caused the number of Presidential
assistants to mushroom. Section 105 limits the number of assistants the President may hire,
but alleviates the limitation somewhat by authorizing the First Lady to detail when she
requires the assistance of the President's staff. Without Section 105(e), the First Lady might
engage in unauthorized "detailing" when she required the assistance of the president's staff.
Section 105(e) solves this problem by specifically authorizing the First Lady to engage in this
practice. The President retains authority to detail employees "from time to time." 5 U.S.C. §
112 (1988).
84. American Physicians,997 F.2d at 920.
85. Id. Arguably, Section 105(e) ensures that the executive mansion will be run as an
efficient household. The President's spouse cannot be expected to tackle such a daunting task
alone, so Congress provided the spouse with assistance. Just as a husband or wife would ask
his or her spouse for permission to hire a housekeeper to maintain the home, Section 105(e)
provides Congress's approval for the presidential spouse to use presidential assistants in the
maintenance of the presidential household.
86. This observation was not lost on the majority in American Physicians. As noted above,
Judge Silberman compared this case to Public Citizen, in which the Supreme Court adopted,
according to Judge Silberman, "an extremely strained construction of the word 'utilized' in order
to avoid the constitutional question." American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 906.
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President's spouse, then as a federal officer the First Lady should be
subject to all federal laws restricting the financial dealings of those
who work for the Government, and she must limit her activities accordingly. 87 On the other hand, if Congress has authorized no such
post for the First Lady, one must question how much authority she
may legally exert in matters of national policy.
An examination of the legislative history of Section 105(e)
indicates that Congress did not consider the First Lady a presidential
adviser at all, let alone create a position for her. Congress adopted
Section 105(e) in the wake of Watergate as part of a White House
authorization bill.88 Over the years, Congress watched as President
Nixon hired six' hundred assistants and President Carter five
hundred, even though Congress had authorized only fourteen.5 9 Thus,
from 1975 to 1978, Congress engaged in a concerted effort to create
accountability within the executive branch for these personal
advisers.90
Congress intended this bill to clarify the role of the President's
staff, limiting its numbers, and controlling its pay. 91 When this
authorization bill came before the House, the provision that became
Section 105(e) was added by amendment. 92 This anomalous amendment does not alter the general purpose of the bill.93 It seems

87. See part IV.
88. See S. Rep. No. 95-868 at 3 (cited in note 83).
89. White House Personnel Authorization, Hearings on H.R. 11003 before the Senate
Subcommittee on Civil Service and General Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (statement of Cong. Herbert E. Harris, II).
90. Authorization for the White House Staff, Part II, Hearings on H.R. 6326 and H.R.
10657 before the House Subcommittee on Employee Ethics and Utilization of the Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978) (prepared statement of
Cong. Herbert E. Harris, II).
91. Virginia Congressman Herbert Harris, II, who sponsored the bill (the culmination of a
three year effort by him, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder of Colorado, and Congressman
Morris Udall of Arizona) stated that the impetus for this action was to prevent a "palace guard"
from developing within the White House by subjecting the hiring and pay of presidential
advisers to Congressional authorization. Authorization for the White House Staff, Hearings on
H.R. 6326 before the House Subcommittee on Employee Ethics and Utilization of the Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). Representative Harris
remarked: "I think, over the past several years, we have suffered as our Government has more
and more tended toward a palace-guard type of operation. I think Congress has a responsibility
it can't duck, and that's the responsibility to designate what staff the President can have. It
should be reasonable, but it should be clear. It should be open. It should be authorized." Id.
92. H.R. 6326, introduced on April 19, 1977, did not contain the provision providing
assistance to the First Lady. H.R. 6326, 95th Cong., 1st Sess (April 26, 1977). However, H.R.
10657, introduced the following year, did contain authorization of assistance to the President's
spouse. H.R. 10657, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 31, 1978). This provision became the present
version of Section 105(e).
93. Mr. Harris reminded the House of his fears:
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counterintuitive that a bill which had the very purpose to increase
accountability of executive assistants would then transform the First
Lady into a federal officer with no defined role, responsibility, or
94
accountability.
Furthermore, Section 105(e) is the only provision of Section
105 that makes use of the word "designate" as opposed to "appoint."
Section 105(a)(1) of the authorization provision allows the President
to "appoint" advisers to perform duties as the President may prescribe. 95 The use of the word "appoint" appears with respect to all
I, for example, have felt very strongly that many of the people that were in actuality
running the Government were never elected and, in effect, were not even known by the
people that they were governing. It seems to me that authorizing legislation is
absolutely necessary for this very important, very vital, part of our Government, so that
Congress does set down at least parameters for how it should function.
Hearings on H.R. 6326 and H.R. 10657 at 8 (cited in note 90).
94. Harrison Wellford, then Executive Director for Reorganization and Management of the
Office of Management and Budget, briefly noted during hearings on Section 105(e) that its
addition merely continued what he believed was an historical practice of providing the First
Lady with staff support when she assisted the President with his duties. "[The section]
continues the historical practice of use of appropriations to assist the spouse of the President in
connection with the spouse's assistance to the President in discharge of the President's duties
and responsibilities." Id. at 12. No one on the House Subcommittee asked a single question
about this provision. In fact, the only question on this section of the bill arose in Senate
subcommittee hearings when Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee asked Wellford point blank what
provision 105(e) did. This time, Wellford's description was more elaborate, but equally cryptic:
This provision makes explicit in the statutory authorization the historical practice
of providing assistance and services for the spouses of the President and Vice President.
The provision is not a grant of additional authority to each spouse but simply allows the
spouse to share the authority granted to the President and Vice President. All staff and
funds would come from those authorized to the President and Vice President. Such
funds could only be used by the spouse for assistance rendered to the President or Vice
President in discharge of their duties and responsibilities.
Hearings on H.R. 11003 at 38 (cited in note 89).
What did Mr. Wellford mean when he stated that the President's spouse "shares the
authority" of the President? If Section 105(e) does "create" an advisory position for the First
Lady, as the Government argued and the American Physicians court accepted, then the First
Lady arguably becomes an officer who shares the President's authority to hire staff. This
assertion would make little sense. The President may not designate his powers to just anyone:
The President of the United States is authorized to designate and empower the
head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof who is
required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform
without approval, ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is
vested in the President by law ...
3 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). The First Lady does not fit any of these categories.
Notably, the historical practice of providing the First Lady with a staff did not begin until
1901 when Edith Roosevelt established an office in the East Wing of the White House (Julia
Tyler had hired a press agent years before, however). Diller and Robertson, Presidents,First
Ladies, and Vice Presidents at 13 (cited in note 36). In fact, even Eleanor Roosevelt, who
received 300,000 letters in 1933, had only one assistant. The rest were borrowed from the
President. Id.
95. 3 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
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advisers in this section, with the notable exception of the provision
authorizing advisers to assist the First Lady.96 This further illustrates the unofficial status of the presidential spouse, as opposed to
an appointed position that would qualify her for "officer" status.
Even more intriguing is that the language of Section 105(e) is
repeated in Section 106(c), 97 only this time, the spouse of the Vice

President is authorized assistance and services in connection with
assistance provided in the discharge of the Vice President's duties.
Although Congress did not express its intentions in enacting Section
106(c), the existence of Section 106(c) does assist an understanding of
Section 105(e). Because the language of the two sections is virtually
identical, Congress arguably intended the same purpose in both.
Thus, we must accept either the premise that Congress created two
official positions, one for the wife of the President and one for the wife
of the Vice President, or that Congress merely allowed presidential
(or vice presidential) advisers to assist the First (or Second) Lady
from time to time while not creating any official status for the First
(or Second) Lady herself.98

By accepting the proposition that the First Lady, qua First
Lady, is an outright, congressionally created federal officer, 99 rather
than looking at Mrs. Clinton's specific appointment to the Health
Care Task Force, the American Physicians court may have created a
constitutional problem far greater than the one it sought to avoid.
One could argue that the First Lady is a private citizen in general,
but that Mrs. Clinton became a federal officer when the President appointed her to head the task force. 100 It is understandable, however,
why the court, and Mrs. Clinton, chose to avoid this reasoning. 101
96. Id. Section 105(a)(1) states that "the President is authorized to appoint and fix the pay
of employees in the White House Office. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Section 105(e), however,
states: "If the President does not have a spouse, such assistance and services may be provided
for such purposes to a family member of the President's family whom the President designates"
(emphasis added). One is "appointed" to the post of Assistant to the President, but "designated"

to fill the 105(e) position.
97.

Section 106(c) states:

Assistance and services authorized pursuant to this section to the Vice President
are authorized to be provided to the spouse of the Vice President in connection with
assistance provided by such spouse to the Vice President in the discharge of the Vice
President's executive duties and responsibilities. If the Vice President does not have a
spouse, such assistance and services may be provided for such purposes to a member of
the Vice President's family whom the Vice President designates.
98. Compare 3 U.S.C. §§ 105(e), 106(c) (1988).
99. See note 81 and accompanying text.
100. See note 101 (suggesting that while the First Lady as such is not a federal officer or
employee, she could become one depending on the role she is given).
101. A similar situation came before John M. Harmon in 1977, while he was Acting

Assistant Attorney General. In an Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") opinion letter, he addressed
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a. Problems,Relatively Speaking: The Anti-Nepotism
Provisionof Title 5
In the wake of President John F. Kennedy's appointment of his
brother to the post of Attorney General, Congress enacted the Postal
the employment statutes of informal presidential advisers for conflict-of-interest purposes. See
1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20 (1977). An informal adviser was defined as one who "advises the
President almost daily, principally on an informal basis." Id. Harmon's analysis, much like the
American Physicianscourt, centered on 5 U.S.C. sections 2104 and 2105. He concluded that "an
identifiable act of appointment may not be absolutely essential for an individual to be regarded
as an officer or employee in a particular case where the parties omitted it for the purpose of
avoiding conflict-of-interest laws or where there was a firm mutual understanding that a
relatively formal relationship existed." Id. at 21. Thus, there must be official retention, designation, appointment or employment of this informal adviser or there must be a basis to infer a
formal relationship. Id.
Though the OLC opinion dealt with applicability of conflict-of-interest statutes, it used the
same officer-employee framework later used to analyze applicability of FACA.
Harmon concluded that informal advice is not a federal function (the second prong of the
Baker test, see notes 61-62 and accompanying text) and that there is no true supervision by a
Federal officer or employee (the third prong of Baker)because "the largely personal relationship
between the President and Mr. A [the informal adviser] apparently [is] based on mutual respect
rather than assignment of duties...." 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21. Harmon noted that "Mr. A"
discusses policy issues daily with the President, "[b]ut we do not believe the mere fact that Mr.
A speaks with the President on a daily basis in itself alters the fundamentally personal nature
of the relationship that is apparently involved here, just as Mrs. Carterwould not be regarded
as a ... Government employee solely on the ground that she may discuss governmental matters
with the Presidenton a daily basis." Id. (emphasis added).
The Harmon opinion seems to conflict with the D.C. Circuit's holding. This OLC opinion
was written before Section 105(e) became law, but this fact does not appear to discount
Harmon's opinion. In fact, Harmon's letter appears especially poignant in the following passage:
Mr. A, however, seems to have departed from his usual role of an informal advisor to the
President in connection with his recent work on a current social issue. Mr. A has called
and chaired a number of meetings that were attended by employees of various agencies,
in relation to this work, and he has assumed considerable responsibility for coordinating
the Administration's activities in that particular area. Mr. A is quite clearly engaging in
a governmental function when he performs these duties, and he presumably is working
under the direction or supervision of the President. For this reason, Mr. A should be
designated as a special Government employee for purposes of this work-assuming that
a good faith estimate can be made that he will perform official duties relating to that
work for no more than 130 out of the next 365 consecutive days. If he is expected to
perform these services for more than 130 days, he should be regarded as a regular
employee. In either case, he should be formally appointed and take an oath of office.
This formal designation would not necessarily affect the conclusion that Mr. A's other
consultations with the President are of a personal rather than official nature. Should
Mr. A assume governmental responsibilities in other areas, as he has done with his
work on the above project, he should be regarded as a Government employee for these
other purposes as well.
Id.
Seen in this light, the OLC opinion suggests that: (a) the First Lady as First Lady is simply
an informal adviser and not an employee; and (b) if the First Lady is selected by the President
to take on unique responsibilities, she may become a federal employee, subject to the strictures
placed upon such employees.
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Rates and Federal Salaries Act in 1967. This statute contains antinepotism provisions that forbid a public official from appointing or
employing a relative in an agency in which he serves or over which he
exercises control. 10 2 The statute explicitly defines the President as a
"Public official.1s 3 It also explicitly includes a spouse in the definition
of "relative.'' 104 President Clinton arguably violated this law when he
appointed his wife to head the health care advisory committee.
In American Physicians, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected
this analysis. It stated that while the President is a public official
and a wife is a relative, the President is not an "agency" bound by the
anti-nepotism act. 10 5 In fact, the court opined that while the statute

bars a President from appointing his brother Attorney General, it
may not prohibit the President from hiring him as a White House
special assistant. 10 6 Judge Buckley found it inconceivable that Mrs.
Clinton would be barred from appointment to the post of Attorney
General, but not, for example, from appointment to the post of
National Security Adviser.

0 7

The American Physiciansmajority held that Section 105(e), as
an implicit recognition by Congress of the First Lady's authority,
undermined the claim that Mrs. Clinton's appointment to the task
force violated federal anti-nepotism laws.108 The court reasoned that
holding otherwise would bring the anti-nepotism laws into conflict
with Congress' intent to allow the presidential spouse to assist the
President. 0 9 Judge Buckley took the opposite view, that it is unreasonable to hold that the First Lady is an officer of the Government
when the holding would conflict with Congress's intent to prohibit

102. 5 U.S.C. § 3110(b) (1988). Specifically, the law states that a "public official may not
appoint, employ, promote, advance.., in the agency in which he is serving or over which he
exercises jurisdiction or control any individual who is a relative of the public official." Id.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 3110(a)(2) (1988).
104. Id.
105. American Physicians,997 F.2d at 905. The court stated that though the anti-nepotism
provision in 5 U.S.C. Section 3110(a)(1)(A) defines a covered "agency" as an "executive agency,"
"we doubt that Congress intended to include the White House or the Executive Office of the
President." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 921 (Buckley, J., concurring). "Viewed purely as a matter of congressional
intent, the argument that the Anti-nepotism Act applies only to the Departments and not to the
White House... is a weak one." Id.
108. Id. at 905.
109. Id.
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nepotism." 0 The legislative history behind the federal anti-nepotism
statute strongly supports Judge Buckley's view.",

Whether the anti-nepotism provisions of Title 5 apply at all the
advisers created under Section 105 requires more analysis, however.
According to Section 105(a)(1), the President is authorized to appoint
and fix the pay of employees in the White House Office without regard
110. Id. at 920. Judge Buckley stated: "[A]ny gravitational pull exerted in the direction of
congressional acceptance of a President's spouse as a 'de facto' officer attributable to Section
105(e) is overwhelmed by the opposite force exerted by the Anti-Nepotism Act." Id.
111. See Federal Pay Legislation, Hearings on S. 1489 and H.R. 7977 before the Senate
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 357-72 (1967).
The committee, after hearing testimony from John W. Macy, Jr., the Chairman of the
United States Civil Service Commission, recommended that the President and the Vice
President be excluded from coverage of the Act, as well as heads of executive agencies with
respect to appointment of their immediate assistants who are exempt from the competitive
service. Id. at 357.
Mr. Macy repeatedly indicated his belief that, as written, the Act would apply to the
President and his advisers. Id. at 361, 363, 364-72. However, he did not support applying the
act to the President, and stated, "I am really not in a position to comment on why the House
applied this [provision] as broadly as it did." Id. at 367. Nevertheless, the Act passed and included the blanket provision.
The hearings not only indicate that the provision applies to the President, but also demonstrates how far it applies. An exchange between Senator Hiram Fong of Hawaii and Mr. Macy
is illustrative:
Senator Fong. So the President of the United States couldn't have anybody in this
category [relatives] work for the Government?
Mr. Macy. This would appear to be the case.
Senator Fong. While he is the headman?
Mr. Macy. Yes. Well, I would modify that. The Constitution actually provides that
the appointing authority is vested in the heads of departments for lesser officials. The
President's appointment authority is circumscribed to a certain identified position or
positions that the Congress may designate subject to his appointment, but I would feel
that regardless of that constitutional technicality the conclusion that you reach would be
the proper one under the law.
Senator Fong. That means then if one of the President's relatives wants a job
anywhere in the government he would never be able to get ajob?
Mr. Macy. That would be my interpretation.
Senator Fong. So it means that you would be taking it out on this man and just
because he is a relative. He had nothing to do with it.
Mr. Macy. That is right.
Id. at 363.
It is also apparent from the hearings that both appointive positions and competitive positions fall under the nepotism law. See id. at 359-63 (discussing the "blanket" prohibition on
appointing and promoting relatives).
The restrictions on the President appeared overbroad to the Committee, especially to
Senator Robert Yarborough of Texas, who remarked: "If they haven't got judgment enough to
know whether to appoint kinsfolk or not they haven't the judgment enough to be President or
Vice President of this country... That is my opinion, and I think certainly it should not apply
to the President and Vice President in my opinion." Id. at 369.
Nevertheless, when the act was passed, the President and Vice President were covered. 5
U.S.C. § 3110(a)(2) (1988).
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to any other provision of law regulating the employment or compensation of persons in the government service.112 Under this reading, the
anti-nepotism provisions, which regulate employment of persons in
the government service, are inoperative on White House advisers.
Thus, this reading of Section 105 supports the Government's position
that the First Lady may be considered an "officer" under the
President.
It appears, however, that Congress understood, when it approved this legislation, that federal conflict-of-interest, nepotism, and
ethics laws would apply to the President and his advisers under
Section 105.113 Otherwise, a President could hire his parents, children, siblings, and first cousins to staff the Executive Office of the
President. A reasoned understanding of the anti-nepotism act
coupled with congressional intent leads to the opposite conclusion:
14
that he could hire none of them.1

112. 3 U.S.C. 105(a)(1) (1988).
113. This precise issue arose during hearings on the White House Personnel Authorization
Act. See Hearings on H.R. 6326 and H.R. 10657 at 20-21 (cited in note 90) (discussing applicability of laws to Section 105 employees). During the hearings, Representative Schroeder asked
F.T. Davis, General Counsel to the Reorganization at the White House, whether a string of
federal laws would apply to Section 105 employees. Id.
Mr. Davis responded:
It's our view of the bill that it exempts from those laws dealing with employment
and compensation and not those dealing with conduct by public officials once they are
appointed. For instance, it would exempt from the Classification Act, laws relating to
the competitive service, and the Veterans Preference Act. However, I might add, it
would not exempt from the restrictions under the nepotism statute because of the specific
provisions of that act which apply to the President.
On the other hand, it would not exempt persons from laws dealing with bribery or
conduct in office which clearly apply to all persons holding office in the Federal
Government.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 3110(a)(3) (1988). In the days before the nepotism ban, First Lady Eleanor
Roosevelt was actually hired for an official New Deal post-assistant director of the Office of
Civilian Defense ("OCD"). She was selected by New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, whom
President Roosevelt had appointed as director of the OCD. Mrs. Roosevelt's position was
voluntary. See Chadakoff, ed., EleanorRoosevelt's My Day at 215-16, 218 (cited in note 5).
In a press conference given soon after her appointment, a reporter asked Mrs. Roosevelt
how she decided to take a public job. The question prompted the following dialogue:
Mrs. Roosevelt: "Well, the mayor had asked the President and seemed to feel that
the time had come when everybody who could do any work as a volunteer should do it.
Therefore, I decided that as I could do it as a volunteer, I had better do it. The mayor
asked the President and me, both. The President has to approve anyone who is going to
be in a position."
Question: "He asked the President not for permission to ask you but for
permission?"
Mrs. Roosevelt: "Just as he would ask about anyone he was bringing in as
assistant director. Whether I would be useful, I suppose. He may have asked him also
from the point of view of having any personal objections. I don't know about that."
Maurine Beasley, ed., The White House Press Conferences of Eleanor Roosevelt 224 (Garland,
1983).
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Section 105(e) read as a whole further illustrates the inconsistency with federal anti-nepotism laws if it is construed to authorize
the First Lady as a government officer. In addition to its authorization of assistance to the First Lady, Section 105(e) states that if the
President does not have a spouse, the services and assistance that
otherwise would have been provided to her may instead be provided to
another family member designated by the President. 115 This part of
Section 105(e) deals the death blow to the suggestion that the First
Lady is a public official.
On the one hand, the ability to designate another family member is arguably proof of Congress's intent to authorize an official position of some kind for the First Lady. If the President has no First
Lady, he may fill the position, just as he would fill a vacant office over
which he has authority. Recognizing the necessity of intimate advice
and assistance only a spouse could provide, Congress, through the
language of Section 105(e) simply allowed for the next best alternative. That is, the President may "appoint," as it were, another family
member to take that place as an unpaid adviser. This interpretation
implicitly assumes that the anti-nepotism law would otherwise bar
the President from appointing a relative to any other advisory position. If the President could always appoint a relative to such a position, there would be no need to include the language in Section 105(e)
that the President may "designate" (as opposed to "appoint") a mem6
ber of his family should he have no spouse."
This interpretation is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First,
if the President has no spouse, he may designate someone else to
fulfill what would otherwise be his wife's historical duties-but he
may select only a family member." 7 If Section 105(e) had specific duAs Mrs. Roosevelt writes, however, "I soon discovered that the very thing I had feared was
true: that I could not take a government position, even without salary or paid expenses, without giving ample opportunity for faultfinding to some members of the opposition in Congress
and even to some of our own party people who disagreed with certain policies." Eleanor
Roosevelt, This I Remember 231-32 (Harper & Brothers, 1st ed. 1949). Though Mrs. Roosevelt
herself received no compensation, she had authority to hire people on her own. To design
children's physical fitness programs, Mrs. Roosevelt hired dancer Mayris Chaney for a $4,000 a
year post. This ignited so much criticism that on February 6, 1942, Congress voted to prohibit
the use of OCD funds for "instruction in physical fitness by dancers. . . ." Chadakoff, ed.,
EleanorRoosevelt's My Day at 239. On February 21, 1942, Mrs. Roosevelt resigned her post. Id.
115. 3 U.S.C. § 105(e). Specifically, the section provides that if the President has no spouse,
assistance "may be provided for such purposes to a member of the President's family whom the
President designates." Id.
116. Id.
117. There have been numerous occasions when a President entered the White House unmarried and used a substitute First Lady to carry out state functions, and on a number of
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ties and responsibilities in mind, then anyone who is qualified to
perform those tasks should be eligible. But, the language allows only
for a family member. It is likely that this provision simply recognizes
that an unmarried President, as a fact of life, would seek the assistance of a family member, as opposed to an unrelated party, for help
when carrying out his personal affairs. Acknowledging this, Congress
provides this family member resources when she assists the
President. It cannot be logically argued, however, that this provision
makes this non-First Lady relative of the President a de facto officer
as well.
In addition, as the American Physicians majority indicated, if
the President does have a spouse, but does not wish to make use of
her assistance, then he may not use any other family member as an
adviser under this provision1 8 because Section 105(e) authorizes assistance to another family member only if the President has no
spouse." 9 If Section 105(e) does create a de facto office for the First
Lady, then the First Lady apparently can never be fired other than
through divorce or death. Only these two actions would free Section
105(e)'s "office" for someone else. As long as this spouse is alive and
remains married to the President, only she is authorized Section
105(e) assistance. It is unlikely that Congress created an office whose
duties could be filled by one person alone-the spouse or designated
relative of the President.
occasions, the substitute First Lady was not a family member. Diller and Robertson, Presidents,
FirstLadies, and Vice Presidents at 92-93 (cited in note 36), note that Thomas Jefferson used
Dolley Madison and a daughter, Martha Jefferson Randolph; Andrew Jackson called upon his
niece, Emily Donelson; Martin Van Buren utilized his daughter-in-law, Angelica Singleton Van
Buren; and James Buchanan had his niece, Harriet Lane, serve in the First Lady's role. Id. at
92. In addition to these instances, the authors discuss "surrogate First Ladies," women who
assumed the social role of the President's spouse when she was unable to fulfill it herself. Id. at
93. President William Henry Harrison prevailed upon his daughter-in-law Jane Irwin Harrison,
while John Tyler asked his daughter-in-law, Priscilla Cooper Tyler to serve after his wife Letitia
suffered a stroke. Id. Zachary Taylor's youngest daughter Mary Elizabeth Taylor acted as an
official hostess, and President Millard Fillmore was assisted by his daughter Mary. Id. First
Lady Jane Pierce, who mourned her only son's death during her husband Franklin's first two
years in the White House, sought out the help of her longtime friend, Abby Kent Means. Id. In
fact, Ms. Means herself received help-from Varina Davis, wife of Jefferson Davis. Id. Andrew
Johnson's wife Eliza, sick with tuberculosis, was replaced by her daughter Martha Johnson
Patterson; Chester A. Arthur, whose wife had been dead for 18 months when he became
President, asked his younger sister Mary Arthur McElroy to arrange social functions. Id.
Finally, before Grover Cleveland married Frances Folsom, his younger sister Rose served as
White House Hostess. Id.
118. Again, such a prohibition assumes that the anti-nepotism laws apply to presidential
advisers.
119. American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 905. The court stated: "We suppose the President
could withdraw any or all authority delegated to his spouse, but then he would be left without
the official assistance of any family member." Id.
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b. An Officer Without an Office?
Section 105(e) is nevertheless of great importance in determining whether the First Lady is to be considered a de facto officer or not.
As discussed above, Section 105(e) must create an office if the First
Lady is to pass even the first test of the Title 5 definition of officer. 120
In United States v. Mouat,121 the Supreme Court stated that a
person must be appointed before she can be considered an officer. 22
The Court found Mouat's appointment as a United States naval officer invalid because there was no statute authorizing his appointment
to a position. Therefore, the Court stated, Mouat was simply not an
officer.123 In the end, however, it is the appointment, and authorization for that appointment, which is absolutely crucial to status as an
officer. 24 Neither can be found for the First Lady.
Semantic games will not work to create an office, either. The
Mouat Court indicated that even when Congress uses the very word
"officer," use of that word alone will not qualify one as an officer.'2 5
Rather, the definition of the word "officer" may vary from statute to
statute when Congress specifically indicates, and a court must
ascertain the word's particular meaning in a specific statute in light
of Congress's intent.126

In Baker v. United States,27 the court of claims faced the issue
of whether Baker, an employee of the New York State Employment
Service ("NYSES"), was also a federal employee, a status enabling
him to collect retirement benefits on the period of his government
service. The court, which relied heavily on Mouat and its progeny,
found that Baker, by his own admission, had never received a formal
federal appointment during his service to the federal government. 28
120. See note 61 and accompanying text.
121. 124 U.S. 303 (1887).
122. Id. at 307. "Unless a person in the service of the Government, therefore, holds his
place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one of the courts ofjustice or heads of
Departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, he is not, strictly speaking, an
officer of the United States." Id.
123. Id. at 308.
124. Id. at 307.
125. Id. at 308. "Undoubtedly congress may have used the word 'officer' in some other
connections in a more popular sense ... in which case it will be the duty of the court in
construing such an act of congress to ascertain its true meaning, and be governed accordingly."
Id.
126. Id. "[lt [is] the duty of the court in construing such an act of Congress to ascertain its
true meaning and be governed accordingly." Id.
127. 614 F.2d 263 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
128. Id. at 268 n.5.
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The court thus equated federal appointment with formal federal
appointment. In fact, the court specifically stated that one cannot
hold a government position as either an officer or employee until a
person authorized to make the appointment so appoints.129 Given that
no one has ever appointed the First Lady, formally or otherwise, to
her "post," it is impossible that she could be considered an employee
or officer. 130 In fact, much as the government argued in American
Physicians,Baker argued that his service for the NYSES satisfied the
'Tederal appointment" requirement. 13' In other words, Baker believed
he had the status of a federal employee based on the duties he
performed, even though he lacked a formal appointment. The Baker
court rejected this reasoning based on the Supreme Court's strong
historical emphasis on the necessity of actual appointment by an
authorized party.

32

If Section 105(e) provides the true authority for the
"employment" of the First Lady, then it does so without definition of
any specific role and without the use of the words "appoint," "employ,"
or "pay."'1 3 Arguably, the President may not have the authority to

relieve the First Lady of her "duties" since the power of removal is
incident to the power to appoint.'3 This reading of the President's
appointment and removal power in the context of the First Lady
would raise a serious separation of powers issue. 3 5 The President
129. Id. at 268.
130. This discussion is limited to the possibility that Section 105(e) creates an office, de
facto or otherwise, for the First Lady. As discussed above, Mrs. Clinton's appointment as head
of the Health Care Task Force may be a federal appointment. See notes 100-01 and
accompanying text.
131. Baker, 614 F.2d at 268 n.5.
132. Id. at 269.
133. 3 U.S.C. § 105(e)
134. Burnap, 252 U.S. at 518.
135. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (stating that Congress cannot limit
the President's power to remove an executive branch official to the extent the restriction would
"interfere impermissibly with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the
laws"). If Section 105(e) creates an office without clear removal power by the President, then
the President's removal power could be implied as constitutionally mandated.
It is possible, however, for Congress to create "offices" over which only it has removal power.
The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976), indicated that Congress may
create "offices" and provide for such method of appointment to those offices as it chooses,
through its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8,cl. 18 (declaring Congress' power to enact "all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper" for executing Congress' authority). However, the Court noted, the method of appointment must comport with Art. H, § 2, cl. 2. Otherwise,
[T]he holders of those offices will not be "Officers of the United States." They may,
therefore, properly perform duties only in aid of those functions that Congress may
carry out by itself, or in an area sufficiently removed from the administration and
enforcement of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons not
"Officers of the United States."
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could presumably say that she is not "assisting" him and prohibit
White House advisers from assisting her under Section 105(e). But
this reading seems strained.
The First Lady keeps an office on the second floor of the West
Wing of the White House, one floor above the President. 136 However,
this physical office does not make her an officer; authorization statutes do. The First Lady, unlike all other major employees in her
office, lacks a direct presidential appointment. 137 In fact, it appears

that ultimate authority over her staff lies not with her, but with
either the President's Chief of Staff or the President himself.1
Any reliance on Section 105(e) as authorization for de facto
officer status is, therefore, shaky at best. Discernible congressional
intent does not favor such a reading, and the lack of any indication of
a formal appointment, a most crucial element of officer status, is
nonexistent.
c. All Work and No Pay Makes the FirstLady... ?
Implications of the Antideficiency Act
Even if the First Lady could be appointed to an official position
without violating the anti-nepotism laws, it seems at least clear that
she could not be paid. 39 In fact, Mrs. Clinton was not paid for her
work on the Health Care Task Force.140 This provision of voluntary
services for the government, however, raises another legal prob-

Id. So even if in Section 105(e) Congress created an office for the First Lady, it is assuredly
within the executive branch, hardly removed from the "administration and enforcement of the
public law." Id.
136. Federal Yellow Book, § I at 1-7, 1-13 (Leadership Directories, Winter 1995). She is on
the same floor with the President's Counsel, the President's Economic Policy Adviser, and the
White House Director of Legislative Affairs. Id.
137. Id. at 1-13. The First Lady's Chief of Staff is technically an Assistant to the President,
and is appointed by him. Id. The Deputy Chief of Staff to the First Lady is also appointed by
the President, and is a deputy assistant to him, as is the First Lady's Press Secretary. Id. The
Director of Scheduling and Social Secretary to the First Lady are both appointed by the
President and serve as Special Assistants to him. Id. The First Lady arguably has no legal
authority to hire and fire staff because all her staff members are either appointed by the
President as personal assistants or they serve one of these assistants.
138. See United States Government Manual 92 (1994) (identifying Chief of Staff Leon
Panetta as authority over entire White House staff, including Mrs. Clinton's staff members).
139. The majority in the American Physicianscase believed that the anti-nepotism provisions of the U.S. Code did not override the position created by 3 U.S.C. § 105, but that the
provisions "may well ban appointment only to paid positions." American Physicians,997 F.2d at
905.
140. Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separationof Powers and the FederalAdvisory
Committee Act, 104 Yale L. J. 51, 54 (1994).
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lem-the Antideficiency Act.' 4 ' This Act prohibits federal agencies
from accepting voluntary services without express statutory authority. 142 Congress enacted the Antideficiency Act to prevent an individ-

ual from providing free services to the government, for which
Congress had made no appropriation, and then suing later for compensation4 3 When this Act is coupled with a statutory ban on the
supplementation of salaries of federal officials, 44 the Antideficiency
Act stands for the proposition that one may not work for the government for no pay, and one may not be paid for government work by
anyone else.145 Thus, if the First Lady is specifically appointed to a
post, not only can it not be a post that pays, because of the anti-nepotism laws, but it cannot be a post that does not pay, because of the
Antideficiency Act. In fact, the Antideficiency Act seems quite appropriate when directed at the First Lady; for, as it has been interpreted,
the Act refers to voluntary services rendered by private persons without authority of law.146
The Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") recently summarized the
conditions under which the government may accept voluntary services
without express statutory authority. 147 First, the services must be
rendered in an official capacity under regular appointment to an
office.

48

Second, the services must otherwise be permitted by law to

be nonsalaried because no minimum salary is required. 149 Using this
test, the OLC approved Professor Laurence Tribe's provision of free
service to the independent counsel when it conducted investigations
on the Iran-Contra Affair under the Reagan administration. 150 Under

141. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (Supp. 1993).
142. 31 U.S.C. § 1342. The statute provides: "An officer or employee of the United States
Government or of the District of Columbia government may not accept voluntary services for
either government or employ personal services exceeding that authorized by law except for
emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property." Id.
143. See generally Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control
Limits on the Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 57, 123-27 (1992)
(discussing various aspects of the Antideficiency Act). The author notes that the Antideficiency
Act dates back to 1884. Id. at 124.
144. See note 164 (noting various limits on outside compensation for upper-level officers
and employees of the government).
145. Nolan, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 124 (cited in note 143) (citing 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 463, 480
(1960)).
146. 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 129, 131 (1913).
147. Nolan, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 126 & n.265 (cited in note 143) (citing Memorandum for
Francis A. Keating, II, Acting Associate Attorney General, re Independent Counsel's Authority
to Accept Voluntary Services-Appointment of Laurence H. Tribe, from Michael Carvin, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel 3-4 (May 19, 1988)).

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 126.
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this test, an official appointment must first be made, and the pay for
the office must be set to zero.
As Professor Nolan recognized, however, this reading
transforms the Antideficiency Act into a grant to accept free services,
as long as the two conditions are met, rather than a prohibition
against their acceptance. 151 According to Professor Nolan, the OLC
test undermines Congressional control over appropriations and places
the shaping of government policy in private hands. 152 Nevertheless, if
the First Lady has not been appointed to her position, the Act appears
to bar her from providing free services to the government, at least
beyond those authorized by Section 105(e).15 3
The American
Physicians court refused to address whether its finding that the First
Lady is a federal officer created problems under the Antideficiency
Act.1M
C. The Baker Test
Federal appointment, performance of a federal function, and
federal supervision are all required in the definition of a federal
officer or employee, pursuant to statute and the dictates of Baker v.
United States.155 This Note has focused primarily on the complex
issue of federal appointment in the First Lady context. The two other
conditions require decidedly less analysis.
The performance of a federal function is probably the easiest
issue to satisfy. Assisting the President in the discharge of his duties
and obligations seems to fit this category. Hosting state dinners, the
classic example of a First Lady's duties, would appear to be a federal
function, as would serving as the head of a Task Force aimed at advising the President on health care reform. 156
The final test of "officer" or "employee" is whether the person is
subject to supervision. As regards the First Lady, this issue is far
151. Id. at 127.
152. Id.
153. This proposition assumes that there is no special statutory authority under which one
may work for free for the Government without such appointment.
154. 997 F.2d at 911 n.10.
155. See notes 61-62; 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104(a)(2) and 2105(a)(2) (requiring the performance of a
federal function to be considered an officer or employee); §§ 2104(a)(3) and 2105(a)(3) (requiring
the individual to be subject to supervision).
156. See note 37. Judge Buckley, on the other hand, noted in his concurring opinion that
the First Lady performs no defined statutory duties. He did not elaborate on whether a First
Lady's typical activities constitute "federal functions." American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 920
(Buckley, J., concurring).
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more elusive.157 Presumably, the First Lady, if an officer, would be
accountable to the President. 158 However, the President would not
likely ever dismiss the First Lady.159 If he did "fire" the First Lady,
the President might face enormous political consequences.160

The

President may be close to other advisers whom he would have great
personal or political difficulty in dismissing, but there seems
something different about firing one's own spouse. The suggestion
that the First Lady is truly politically accountable to the President is
fiction.
IV. CONSEQUENCES
Under Congress' statutory scheme, the First Lady is neither an
employee nor an official of the government. The ramifications of this
conclusion are profound. Obviously, one could pick through the Code
and find every provision which mentions "officer" or "employee" and
simply say it does or does not apply. But the consequences of this
finding have special significance in our time in defining the role of the
First Lady and requiring limits on it.
A Outside Employment
One of the most interesting and relevantl6l implications of the
First Lady's role in government is the issue of whether the
presidential spouse may serve the government in any capacity, official
or otherwise, and continue to maintain employment in the private

157. See note 61.

158. Under Section 105(e), the President is the only one to whom she could be accountable
because he would be the one who "hires" her.
159. See American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 905 (noting that such an option would be a
"rather extreme alternative[ T").
160. A scandal in Peru in which its President "fired" his wife from the post of First Lady resulted in great political turmoil. See note 1.
161. As the 1996 presidential race gears up, the role of the First Lady is again debated in
the national media.

Chuck Jones, a political analyst at the Brookings Institution, recently

stated: "We're in a period where, in contrast to the Reagans and Bushes, two professionals head
up families. It is a fact of life and it's going to be a fact of politics." Independence Marks
Potential FirstLadies, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle 19A (March 19, 1995). Sheila Tate,
press secretary for former First Lady Nancy Reagan remarked: "From a career woman's

standpoint, there will be a lot of support for a first lady who continues in her career while her
husband is president .... Sooner or later that's going to happen." Id. See Women's Place,
Atlanta Journal and Constitution 18A (March 25, 1995) (stating that "[n]o matter who's elected
in 1996, chances are good the nation has seen the last of first ladies whose roles are restricted to
homemaker and volunteer").

1995]

ROLE OF THE FIRST LADY

1251

sector. 162 It is unclear whether the First Lady should have to sacrifice
a successful career in the private sector simply because her husband
3
is elected President. 16
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 limits the amount of
outside earned income for certain upper-level "officers" or "employers)"
of the federal government.'6
President Bush, however, issued
executive orders prohibiting senior advisers from any outside
employment while employed in the White House. 65 If the presidential
162. Eleanor Roosevelt received $3,000 from Pond's cosmetics firm for each of thirteen
broadcasts of a radio program, My Day, which she began in 1937. Though she donated most of
the money to the American Friends Service Committee, $500 was used for expenses and her
agent's fees. This personal use of fees was not reported to the public. Maurine H. Beasley,
EleanorRoosevelt and the Media 113 (U. of Ill., 1987).
163. The law has recognized a need to place restrictions on the employment opportunities
of one spouse when the other spouse is engaged in a sensitive occupation. In Application of
Gaulkin, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the question of whether a wife of a
superior court judge could run for public office in contravention of New Jersey law. 69 N.J. 185,
351 A.2d 740 (1976). The purpose of the New Jersey law was to prevent judges' embroilment in
politics and to prevent any assumption that the views of the political spouse were the views of
the judge. Id. at 742. The court determined that the complete ban on political office-seeking
was no longer necessary, focusing "upon the trend of modern law which reflects society's
realistic appreciation of the independence of both spouses in marriage and more specifically
represents modern awareness and sensitivity to individual freedoms, rights, responsibilities and
development." Id. at 744.
Nevertheless, the court maintained a number of restrictions,
including banning the judge from accompanying his wife to political gatherings. Id. at 747.
The fear of tainting the judiciary with the stain of political favoritism required the limitations.
Fear of tainting the President with this same appearance of impropriety might well require
similar restrictions on the First Lady.
164. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
Section 501 of the Act limits the outside earned income of certain upper level officers or
employees of the federal government. Id. If the First Lady is not an "officer" or "employee,"
though, then presumably these restrictions do not apply to her. Section 502 of the Act forbids:
(1) compensation for affiliation with or employment by firms or corporations;
(2) the officer's or employee's name from being used by that entity;
(3) compensation for practicing a profession involving a fiduciary relationship;
(4) serving for compensation as an officer or board member of any association,
corporation, or entity;
(5) compensation for teaching without prior approval, in the case of an executive
branch officer or employee of the Office of Government Ethics.
Id. Again, these provisions may be inapplicable to the First Lady if she is not considered an
officer or employee.
165. See 3 C.F.R. 301 (1989), as amended, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1990), now codified, as amended, at
5 U.S.C.S. § 7301 (Supp. 1994):
Section 101. Principles of Ethical Conduct. To ensure that every citizen can have
complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each Federal employee
shall respect and adhere to the fundamental principles of ethical service as implemented
in regulations promulgated under sections 201 and 301 of this order....
Sec. 102: Limitations on Outside Earned Income.
(a) No employee who is appointed by the President to a full-time noncareer
position in the executive branch (including full-time noncareer employees in the White
House Office, the Office of Policy Development, and the Office of Cabinet Affairs), shall
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spouse achieves senior adviser status simply by virtue of his or her
relationship with the President, then he or she would be foreclosed
from any outside career opportunities. Notably, however, the order
exempts White House Office employees with salaries below a specified
amount from a complete ban on outside income activities. 166 Although
this Note argues that the ban on outside employment does not apply
to the First Lady because she is not an employee of the government,
even if she were an officer or employee, she would be exempted from
the ban. Because she earns nothing, she may apparently seek outside
compensation. This possibility is troubling for several reasons. The
mere proximity of high level officials to the President causes any
67
suspicions cast on their ethical behavior to be transferred to him.

The press attention associated with such conduct distracts officials
from their duties. Thus, the President has a significant interest in
limiting outside conduct. 16
In addition to restricting outside employment, federal law
prohibits officers or employees of the executive branch from personally and substantially participating in government decisions that
affect their financial interest or the financial interests of their
receive any earned income for any outside employment or activity performed during that
Presidential appointment.
5 U.S.C.S. § 7301.
166. Id. Specifically, Section 102(b) of the order states:
The prohibition set forth in subsection (a) shall not apply to any full-time
noncareer employees employed pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 105 and 3 U.S.C. 107(a) at salaries
below the minimum rate of basic pay then paid for GS-9 of the General Schedule. Any
outside employment must comply with relevant agency standards of conduct, including
any requirements for approval of outside employment.
Id.
167. Nolan, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 141-43 (cited in note 143).
Those who are close to the President are likely to be the subjects of ethical
inquiries most often. Their closeness to the President alone makes their behavior
interesting to the press and to the public. Moreover, their relative power and prestige
make them likely subjects of investigations or suspicions. Because such inquiries
receive generous press attention, and because the President's own image may be
tarnished when those close to the President are the subjects of ethical inquiries, those
inquiries inevitably demand immediate and substantial attention, which usually
distracts the responders from their official duties.
For these reasons, the President has a significant control interest in minimizing
the opportunity for even an inquiry about the conduct of close presidential advisers.
Such an interest supports presidential limitation on outside earned income of the
President's appointees, even if such income is completely unrelated to official matters or
subjects. This interest, however, is the President's alone.... Each President should
determine how to exercise it and to what extent the interest should be used to limit
outside income, and should express the limitations by presidential order. When
exercising this power, however, Presidents should restrict the category of covered
officials to those who are truly closely identified with the President.
Id. at 142-43 (footnotes omitted).
168. Id. at 142.
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spouses. 169 This prohibition became a serious issue for Hillary Clinton
when eighty-one members of Congress formally asked the Office of
Government Ethics ("0GE") to investigate whether Mrs. Clinton
violated the law when she made statements about the health care
industry while she held investments in a fund that profited from a
Republican Congressman
decline in value of drug stocks. 170
Christopher Cox, who initiated the request, cited the American
Physicians court's finding that Mrs. Clinton was a de facto officer or
employee of the government for FACA purposes. He stated that Mrs.
Clinton should be considered the same for purposes of the criminal
conflict-of-interest provision of 18 U.S.C. § 208.171
The OGE, in a letter written by its chairman, Stephen Potts,
replied that while it may be true that Mrs. Clinton is a de facto officer
or employee for FACA purposes, that possibility did not necessarily
command the same finding for this criminal statute. 72 The OGE

169. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993). Note that under 18 U.S.C. § 202(c), the
President is exempted from this restriction, so actions affecting his spouse's financial condition
would not be imputed to him under this provision. 18 U.S.C. § 202(c) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
170. See Letter from Stephen D. Potts, Director, Office of Government Ethics, to
Congressman Christopher Cox 1, 6 (May 3, 1994) (referring to the initial requests for an investigation) (available on file at OGE) ("Letter from Stephen Potts"). The Wall Street Journal
reported that Hillary Clinton and the Health Care Task Force were creating uneasiness in the
pharmaceutical markets. See John R. Dorfman, Cocking the Trigger on Buying Drug Stocks,
Wall St. J. C1 (March 23, 1993) (stating- "Drug stocks have been falling for 15 months. And
they're likely to get roughed up further in April, as people try to guess what therapy Hillary
Rodham Clinton's task force will prescribe for the nation's health-care system"). When it was
discovered that Mrs. Clinton had tens of thousands of dollars invested in Valuepartners, a
money management fund, which had been selling short on drug stocks (profiting from a decline
in value), members of Congress sought an investigation to determine whether Mrs. Clinton was
illegally profiting from her position. See Judi Hasson, FirstLady Invests in Fund with Health
Care Ties, USA Today 4A (May 20, 1993) (noting the White House's disclosure of Mrs. Clinton's
investment). See also Frank Call, How Blind is Your Trust?, Money 5 (July, 1993) (reporting
Mrs. Clinton's investment in Valuepartners at $97,500).
171. Letter from Stephen Potts at 3. See also 5 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993)
(placing criminal liability on anyone who is "an officer or employee of the executive branch" for
participating in government decisions affecting his other financial interests). Since the
language "officer or employee" appears, Mr. Cox argued that Mrs. Clinton should be accountable
if an "officer or employee" as a result of the American Physiciansholding. Letter from Stephen
Potts at 3.
172. Id. Mr. Potts stated: 'The interests served by FACA and the purposes of the federal
conflicts of interest statutes are not the same.... We do not believe that simply because she is
the First Lady she has the status of an officer or employee of the executive branch." Potts
observed, though, that:
Mhat is not to say the spouse of a President could never be an officer or employee of the
executive branch; we recognize that Mrs. Clinton has been given a very public role with
the Task Force. But it is far from settled that by virtue of that role she is therefore an
officer or employee of the executive branch for purposes of the conflicts statutes.
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declined to decide whether the First Lady would be subject to the
conflict-of-interest provisions based upon her status because it could
dismiss the complaint on other grounds. 173 The OGE was thus able to
stave off the issue of the legal accountability of the First Lady just as
the American Physicians court had done.
B. Revolving-Door Restrictions
Federal law permanently restricts any person who is an officer
or employee of the executive branch from lobbying the government
under various circumstances. 174 Notably, under the Ethics Reform Act
of 1990 Technical Amendments, Congress removed language that
employed the Title 5 definitions of officer and employee, perhaps
suggesting that scope of the Act extends beyond the Title 5 defimitions.175 If the First Lady is a Title 5 officer or employee, then the
various restrictions certainly apply to her. In addition, the law may
still apply to her even if she is not an officer or employee within the
meaning of Title 5. The American Physicians court left this issue
176
undecided.
Even if the First Lady is not an officer or employee of the federal government under the definition provided in Title 5, there is good
reason to apply the conflict-of-interest restrictions to her regardless.
In addition to placing general restrictions on officers or employees,
the provision places specific restrictions on Section 105 appointees of
the President and Vice President. 177 By singling these advisers out for
173. Id. at 3-4 (stating that the status of Mrs. Clinton as First Lady or as chair of the
Health Care Task Force need not be determined if another element of 18 U.S.C. § 208 could not
be established). The OGE stated that since Section 208 requires participation in a "particular
matter," the issue of health care reform was too broad, failing the "particular" requirement. Id.
at 4-5 (calling attempts to characterize health care reform as a particular matter "fatally
flawed!).
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (prohibiting (1) officers and employees
from (2) making, with the intent to influence, (3) any communication to or appearance before
any officer or employee of any department or agency (4)in connection with a particular matter
in which the Unites States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, (5) in which the
person participated personally and substantially as such officer or employee, and (6) which
involved a specific party at the time).
175. Act of May 4, 1990, P.L. 101-280, 104 Stat. 158.
176. American Physicians,997 F.2d at 911 n.10 ("We do not need to consider whether Mrs.
Clinton's presence on the Task Force violates... any conflict-of-interest statute).
177. See 18 U.S.C. §207(c) & (d) (1988 and Supp. 1993). Under 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2), all
officers and employees of the Executive Branch" are restricted from making, with intent
to influence, "any communication to or appearance before any officer or employee of any
department, agency, court... on behalf of any other person ...in connection with a
particular matter... (B) which such person knows or reasonably should know was
actually pending under his or her official responsibility as such officer or employee
within a period of 1 year before the termination of his or her service or employment with
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special treatment, Congress recognized the widespread influence such
top executive branch officials obtain. The First Lady, a confidant at
least as close to the President as these advisers, should be subject to
similar regulation.
In 1988, the House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Government Relations took up hearings on the issue of restricting
post-employment activities of federal officers and employees. 178 In
testimony before the subcommittee, Archibald Cox, the Chairman of
Common Cause, identified four distinct fears about influence peddling
in government. He stated that (1) the official, hoping to work as a
lobbyist once out of government, will curry favor with prospective
employers or clients while still in office; (2) the ex-official will use
special access to inside information for the benefit of his private employer or client; (3) the ex-official will be able to maintain authority
over people once below her in rank even though she now deals with
them as a private citizen; and (4) the ex-official turned lobbyist petitions government as a friend and insider and will receive special
treatment as a result. 79 These fears apply equally well to the First
Lady as they do to any of the other advisers and officials mentioned
under the Act.
If Congress viewed the First Lady to be in a position of
authority, as it views other Section 105 officers, then it should have
applied the revolving-door provisions to her as well. If the purpose of
this ethics law is to prevent the exertion of undue influence by
"revolving door" government officials, the First Lady should be
included unless, of course, Congress does not view the First Lady as a
government official.
If, as the American Physicians court held, the First Lady is a
de facto officer of the government, the provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act should govern her future activity and bar Mrs.
Clinton from lobbying the government on various health care matters
when she leaves office. As a relatively young and successful attorney,
the United States or the District of Columbia, and (C) which involved a specific party or
specific parties at the time it was so pending.
18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
An additional restriction is placed upon "Very Senior Personnel of the Executive Branch,"
preventing them from appearing before any officer or employee of the department or agency in
which that person served within one year. See 18 U.S.C. §207(c).
178. Restrictions on the Post-Employment Activities of Federal Officers and Employees,
Hearing on H.R. 4917 and H.R. 5043 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Government Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1988).
179. Id.
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Mrs. Clinton may not desire such a restriction. Congress, on the
other hand, should add the First Lady to the list of those covered by
federal ethics laws.
C. Bribery
Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 201, makes it unlawful to bribe a public official. 180 Unlike Title 5, which regulates the
conduct of "officers" and "employees," this provision applies to "public
officials" and may, thus, be broader in scope. 181 The definition of
"public official" includes, for example, persons acting for or on behalf
of the United States.182 Would this include the First Lady?
Rather than applying strict definitional standards, the bribery
statutes call for a broad construction. 83 Courts have repeatedly ac-

180. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
Whoever1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any
public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers or
promises any public official or any person who has been selected to be a public official to
give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intentA) to influence any official act; or
B) to influence such public official; or
C) to induce such public official... to do or omit to do any act in violation of
the lawful duty of such official or person; ... shall be fined not more than three times
the monetary equivalent of the thing of value or imprisoned for not more than fifteen
years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
under the United States.
Id.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a), provides:
(a) For the purpose of this section(1) the term "public official" means Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident
Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee
or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or
branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official
function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of
Government, or a juror;
(2) the term "person who has been selected to be a public official" means any
person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public official, or has been officially
informed that such person will be so nominated or appointed; and
(3) the term "official act" means any decision or action on any question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may
by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such
official's place of trust or profit.
Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally Carolyn G. O'Brien, Federal CriminalConflict of Interest, 31 Am.Crim.
L. Rev. 569 (1994) (outlining basic federal policy on bribery and conflict of interest laws); Susan
Daunhauer Phillips, Comment, The Federal Bribery Statute: An Argument for Cautious
Revision, 68 Ky. L. J. 1026, 1031-32 (1980) (illustrating the breadth and vagueness of present
federal bribery law).
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cepted this preference for broad interpretation.184 In Dixson v. United
States,15 the Supreme Court defined the meaning of "public official"
as including all those who occupy positions of public trust and federal
responsibilities.186
The Court, acknowledging the possibility of
overbreadth, required that there be "some degree of official
responsibility for carrying out a federal program or policy." 87
Under this analysis, the First Lady may fall under the bribery
prohibitions even if she is not a federal officer within the meaning of
Title 5. The First Lady resides in the White House, advises the
President on a host of issues, and is generally responsible for many
state functions.58
In United States v. Romano, 89 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that even though an EPA employee had been terminated from his official functions, he was still employed and performing an "important service" for the Agency.190 In Romano, the defen-

dant contended he was merely a "civilian, masquerading in 'public
official's' clothing."'19
Keeping with a tradition of broad interpretation of Section 201
of Title 18, the court rejected the defendant's argument and stated
that even without official duties, the concept of "public official" was
184. Phillips, Comment, 68 Ky. L. J. at 1032.
185. 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
186. Id. at 496. Dixson involved the issue of whether Section 201 should apply to employees of entities receiving federal grants. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated: "ITihe
proper inquiry is... whether the person occupies a position of public trust with official federal
responsibilities. Persons who hold such positions are public officials within the meaning of §
201 and liable for prosecution under the federal bribery statute." Id.
187. Id. at 499.
188. See id. at 499-500 (giving examples of what constitutes official responsibility). The
Dixson majority pointed out that its decision was fully consistent with Krichman v. United
States, 256 U.S. 363 (1921), in which a baggage porter for a federal railroad was determined not
to be a public official because he had no duties of an official character. Krichman, 256 U.S. at
366.
However, Dixson was a 5-4 decision. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that the
statutory language of Section 201 is unclear as to the situation of federal grantees, as "Congress

apparently has never specifically considered the statute's coverage of federal grant recipients.
The legislative history is simply silent on the question to be answered in these cases." Id. at 502

(O'Connor, J., dissenting). As the language is also unclear as to the First Lady, it is possible
that, under the dissent's interpretation of the statute, federal bribery laws would not apply to
her.
189. 879 F.2d 1056 (2d Cir. 1989).
190. Id. at 1059. Romano, who worked in the interior demolition business, paid EPA agent

Stecker to keep silent about various EPA violations. Stecker had already been "turned" by the
government and was working as an informant when the money was paid. Romano was convicted for bribery. On appeal, Romano argued that Stecker was not a "public official" within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 201(a). Id. at 1057-60.
191. Id.
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satisfied.192 Furthermore, the court reasoned that if a person acts in
an official function, she qualifies as a public official for purposes of the
193
bribery statute even if she is not an officer or employee.
As discussed in Part III of this Note, the First Lady has no
"official" duties defined by statute. Arguably, then, federal bribery
laws would not apply to her in the conduct of unauthorized duties. In
United States v. Kidd,19 however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a similar argument. In Kidd, the defendant argued that although he bribed an Army private to issue him identification cards,
the federal bribery statute could not apply because no statute authorized the private to issue such cards at all; and the private was, thus,
not engaged in an official duty. 195 According to the defendant, one
must be induced to violate one's "lawful duties" for the Act to apply.'9
The Kidd court stated that a "lawful duty" need not be one specifically
97
imposed by statute.1

In United States v. Birdsall, 98 the Supreme Court stated that
official action need not be required by statute or even prescribed by a
written rule or regulation for federal bribery laws to criminalize the
activity in question. 199 In fact, the Court said that a department's
"settled practice" could establish official duties sufficient for bribery

192. Id. The court explained that Stecker was still an "employee" of the EPA and on the
federal payroll; even though he had "turned" government informant, his duties were curtailed,
and he had agreed to plead guilty to a crime, the court ruled he was still
covered by the statute's
concept of "public official" Id. at 1059. The court admitted that the issue of determining who
fell under the definition of public official had not squarely presented itself before the Second
Circuit, but the court believed its interpretation was in line with that of other circuits. Id.
193. Id. (citing Hurley v. United States, 192 F.2d 297, 299 (4th Cir. 1951)).
194. 734 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1984).
195. Id. at 412.
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C) (1988) (requiring violation of lawful duties to invoke the
statute).
197. Kidd, 734 F.2d at 412.
198. 233 U.S. 223 (1914).
199. Id. at 230-31. Birdsall, an attorney for persons indicted for unlawfully selling liquor to
Indians, was charged with bribing two special officers appointed by the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs-the officer's duty was to advise the Commissioner on matters concerning offering
clemency in such cases. Id. at 227-28. At issue was whether this "advice" constituted "official
action." The Court stated:
To constitute it official action, it was not necessary that it should be prescribed by
statute; it was sufficient that it was governed by a lawful requirement of the department
under whose authority the officer was acting. Nor was it necessary that the
requirement should be prescribed by a written rule or regulation. It might also be found
in an established usage which constituted the common law of the department and fixed
the duties of those engaged in its activities. In numerous instances, duties not
completely defined by written rles are clearly established by settled practice, and
action taken in the course of their performance must be regarded as within the
provisions of the above-mentioned statutes against bribery.
Id. (citations omitted).
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laws to apply.200 In the case of the First Lady, the assistance she
provides the President in the performance of his duties 2°l might constitute an "official act" for the purposes of federal bribery laws. Thus,
federal criminal laws might proscribe a First Lady from accepting
compensation 2 2 in exchange for her efforts to influence her husband's
opinion even though she is not an officer or employee of the government.
V. CONCLUSION
The First Lady is not an employee or officer of the
Government, de facto or otherwise.
The D.C. Circuit erred in
American Physicians because it wanted to avoid subjecting FACA to
constitutional analysis. The court's reasoning has since come under
20 3
fire, even within the D.C. District Court.
Rather than take the hard road and rule directly on FACA's
constitutionality, the D.C. Circuit sought to avoid the issue that as it
turns out, it should have taken anyway.20 4 Instead, it chose to create

200. Id.
201. See 3 U.S.C. § 105(e) (recognizing the First Lady's assistance to the President in the
performance of his duties).
202. The bribery statutes do not require money to change hands, which might sound
implausible, but presumably cover a promise of future employment, or even a campaign contribution to another political candidate in return for her support. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)
(including within the bribery prohibition "anything of value").
203. In Northwest ForestResource Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009 (D. D.C. 1994), a case
in which FACA played a central role, Judge Thomas Jackson was less than fond of the word
games the court played to reach its conclusion that FACA did not apply to the Health Care Task
Force. Judge Jackson wrote that the American Physicians court engaged in "adroit semantics
and near-clairvoyant discernment of legislative intent" to avoid subjecting the Health Care Task
Force to the strictures of FACA. Id. at 104. Yet, the court acknowledged the "importance of
avoiding the constitutional issue to the last." Id.
204. As far as the legitimacy of the Health Care Task Force was concerned, the tortured
statutory interpretation engaged in by the American Physicians court to prohibit FACA's
application was for naught. The case was precipitated by the belief that everyone in an advisory
role on the Task Force was a federal official, with the exception of Mrs. Clinton, and the
American Physicians court, to preserve FACA, ruled her an official. However, it was later
discovered that private individuals sat on the committee, some with advisory roles. Toni Locy,
Judge Asks U.S. Attorney to Probe MagazinerStatement, Wash. Post A9 (Dec. 22, 1994). Judge
Lamberth, in a six page opinion, stated: "We now know, from the records produced in this
litigation, that numerous individuals who were never federal employees did much more than
just attend working group meetings on an intermittent basis, and we now know that some of
these individuals even had supervisory or decision-making roles. The extent to which these
individuals were subjected to conflict-of-interest scrutiny is also questionable." Association of
American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Hillary Rodham Clinton 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19925 *4.
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a legal role for the First Lady that does not exist.25 But even adroit
semantics cannot help escape the conclusion that the First Lady is not
an officer or employee under the Constitution. The discussion of the
First Lady's role in government need not stop here, however.
A careful analysis of the role of the First Lady indicates that
her status, though largely undefined, is that of a private citizen.
Some statutory restrictions limit the First Lady's conduct, as seen in
the application of federal bribery laws, which apply to the First Lady
regardless of whether she is a congressionally authorized employee or
officer of the government. The law is less clear as to the applicability
of other federal ethics laws, which apply only to "officers" and
"employees" of the federal government. The First Lady's unparalleled
access to the world's most powerful man, our fear of influence peddling, and our assumptions about the sway spouses hold over one
another call for Congress to take action to shape and define the legal
206
role of the First Lady.
CarlDavid Wasserman*

205. See Naftali Bendavid, The FirstLady and the Law, Legal Times 1 (March 15, 1993).
Bendavid reported that Republican Congressman William Clinger of Pennsylvania, the senior
Republican on the House Government Operations Committee, offered in February, 1993 to
sponsor a bill specifically allowing the First Lady to serve on a task force while keeping its
meetings secret. White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum rejected the offer, stating that: "[ilt
is our opinion that the Federal Advisory Committee Act ... does not, and was not intended by
Congress to, apply to the health care task force." American Physicians, 813 F. Supp. at 89-90
n.12.
206. As Judge Lamberth noted, "Passage of legislation is advantageous.... [A]ction by
Congress, rather than the judicial rewriting of an inconvenient statute... is the proper way for
laws to be made in this democracy." American Physicians,813 F. Supp. at 89-90 n.12.
*
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